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En la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, la noche al 15 de Febrero, 1999, falla un cable en uno de las 
subestaciones de la compañía eléctrica Edesur. La falla provoca un incendio en el túnel de 
cables, el cual genera la interrupción de energía eléctrica en diez (10) barrios porteños. Más 
de 150.000 clientes de Edesur (aproximadamente 600.000 personas) en Capital Federal son 
afectados por el apagón en el primer momento; en sus domicilios, en oficinas, en bancos, en el 
tren subterráneo y por las calles. El apagón dura once días en pleno verano con temperaturas 
arriba de los +30
oC. Un problema técnico que aparentó ser de rápida solución se transformó 
rápidamente en un conflicto social y una crisis económica y política que duraría más de dos 
meses.  
 
El presente estudio de caso analiza la crisis social y política que fue producida a partir del 
apagón en Buenos Aires desde una perspectiva teórica cognitiva-institucional, en la cual los 
procesos de toma decisiones y de comunicación son vitales. Aspectos tales como definición 
del problema, procesamiento de información, politización de crisis y acciones simbólicas son 
analizados dentro del contexto cultural, político y económico de Buenos Aires y Argentina. 
Una de las dimensiones centrales en este análisis es la cuestión de los procesos de 
privatización de los servicios públicos, siendo una característica de la política económica 
argentina de la última década. Este trabajo es un estudio sobre el reciente apagón de Buenos 
Aires y también una contribución a las discusiones teóricas sobre manejo de situaciones de 
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In the City of Buenos Aires on the night to February 15, 1999, a cable fails in one of the 
Edesur substation tunnels, provoking a fire, which is followed by a power outage. Over 
150.000 Edesur clients (approximately 600.000 individuals) in ten Buenos Aires quarters are 
affected in their homes, in offices, at banks, in the underground and in the street on the first 
day of the power outage. This would last for eleven days in Argentinean mid summer with 
temperatures over +30
oC. What appeared to be a quickly solved technical problem soon 
developed into a social conflict and a political and economic crisis that would last for more 
than two months.  
 
This study analyses the social and political crisis that was produced in the wake of the power 
outage in Buenos Aires from a cognitive institutional perspective, in which decision making 
and communication are vital processes. Aspects such as problem framing, information 
processing, politicisation of crises and symbolic action are analysed within the Buenos Aires 
and Argentinean cultural, political and economic context. One central dimension of the 
analysis is the issue of privatisation of the public services; a particular feature of Argentinean 
political economy during the last decade. This is a case study on the Buenos Aires blackout 
but also a contribution to theoretical discussions on crisis management in the spheres of 
'private' and 'public'; of State and Market.      
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1. Introduction 
Buenos Aires, famous for tango and nightlife, capital city of the Argentine Republic and one 
of the megalopolis on the Latin American continent, surpassing the number of 15 millions of 
inhabitants. Buenos Aires is an important Latin-American commercial centre and is by far the 
major scene for business and politics at a national level. This port city is situated at the shores 
of the Rio de la Plata, enjoying a humid climate that is rainy in winter and often suffocating 
warm in summer. In the month of February 1999, which is mid summer in the Southern 
Hemisphere, temperatures were the highest so far that summer, surpassing the +35
oC.  
     The usual state of things in the heart of this city is one of crowds of people that work and 
live there and a rather chaotic traffic milieu. This social landscape was suddenly transformed 
into an urban desert when a power outage, due to a cable failure and a fire in one of the city's 
electricity substations, was produced in the early hours of February 15. Important parts of the 
City of Buenos Aires were out of electricity, creating an infrastructural and social chaos. The 
power outage lasted for 11 days and although no fatal victims were counted, the lack of 
electricity, water, refrigeration, sewage, light and air conditioning had important social and 
economic consequences. More than 600.000 affected inhabitants in 10 quarters; 240 traffic 
lights out of function; 11.000 small enterprises affected stipulating 900.000.000 US$ in 
economic losses; 1.450 buildings attended by the Civil Defence; 3.000.000 litres of water, 
6.500 bags of ice cubes, 52.500 packs of candles distributed. What started out as a highly 
technical problem became a two-month long corporate and public crisis, putting in evidence 
the social and political nature of a contingency.  
 
1.1 Purpose 
This case study is part of the case bank of crisis management research at CRiSMART (Crisis 
Management Research and Training) at the Swedish National Defence College and at the 
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, enjoying financial support from the Swedish 
Agency for Civil Emergency Planning (ÖCB). The raison d’être of CRISMART is clearly 
stated as to provide new knowledge on the complexity of crisis management and to improve 
conditions for emergency planning, and thus, generating an invaluable nexus between theory 
and praxis on this issue. With this aim, the desire is here to contribute to the empirical 
knowledge on the 1999 Buenos Aires power outage, as well as posing further theoretical  
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questions on processes of crisis response, by which both scientists and practitioners may 
benefit. 
 
The work of CRiSMART includes an important case bank of analysed crises in Sweden and 
in the Baltic countries (Sundelius, Stern & Bynander, 1997; Stern & Bynander, Eds, 1998; 
Stern & Nohrstedt, Eds, 1999) since the launch of the research project in 1997. Contingencies 
in late 1990s such as the abduction case of the two young Swedish missionaries in Daghestan 
(Nohrstedt, 2000), the ice storm (Newlove, 1998) and the Red River floodings (Svedin, 1999) 
in Canada, the power outage in Auckland, New Zealand (Newlove, Stern & Svedin, 2000), 
the Mad Cow crisis in the EU Commission (Grönvall, 2000), the environmental catastrophe in 
the Doñana National Park area in southern Spain (Ullberg, 2001), have all been investigated 
by this research team and thus clearly motivating the international profile of the project. There 
are important traits of these crisis situations -cultural, historical, political and economic 
differences apart- that deserve to be examined and that very well serve the purpose of 
opportunities for learning.  
 
The Buenos Aires blackout is an interesting case in several aspects. Studies that focus upon 
energy related contingencies are undoubtedly of outmost interest to contemporary policy 
makers as well as crisis managers. The electricity dependency that features modern society in 
general and urban settings in particular, where the negative impact is probable to be higher, 
compared to a rural context, makes these extremely vulnerable in situations where power is 
interrupted. The above mentioned Auckland power outage in 1998 (Newlove, Stern & Svedin, 
2000) and the present Buenos Aires cases are proof of this, as is the Kista power outage 
(Sweden) in March 2001 (Deverell, forthcoming) and also the severe energy problems in 
other parts of the world. In California (USA) the consumption of electricity is at present so 
high that production is insufficient (Jansson, 2001), and in Brazil, including the cities of São 
Paolo and Rio de Janeiro, the 2001 summer draughts drastically affected energy production 
(El País, 18 May 2001). In these last mentioned countries systematic rationing must be 
implemented, interrupting service for hours per day, which has severe social, economic and 
political consequences.  
          The involvement of a private company as one of the key actors is another interesting 
possibility for studying. On the one hand, it widens the field of studying of the crisis response 
within a corporation, contributing to the theoretical and empirical development of this field of 
study. From a national politics perspective, on the other hand, it is interesting to scrutinise the  
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management of a crisis within the complexity of privatisation of state companies; a growing 
trend wide world. As such, the Buenos Aires blackout could also be an interesting case for 
comparison with the Auckland power outage in 1998, analysed by Newlove, Stern & Svedin 
(2000). This case shows striking parallels with its 'crisis cousin' in Argentina one year later. 
Both occurred in mid summer with extremely high temperatures and both occurred within a 
political economic context of deregulation of the energy sector. The scope of analysis of the 
Auckland Unplugged (Ibid.) report is far deeper than the present Buenos Aires case though. 
This fact has, since the beginning of my work, made me feel that approaching this analysis 
from a comparative angle between these two cases would not be really fair. However, during 
my work I realised that important parallels can still be drawn, which are of interest for crisis 
management research in general and the electricity sectors in particular. The Auckland case is 
therefore present all along this study, although an explicit comparison has not been the major 
objective. It appears that sometimes the purposes of a journey appear by own means 'on the 
way'.   
 
1.2  Methodology & Sources 
The methodology entailed for this case study is one of a four-step procedure (Sundelius, Stern 
& Bynander, 1997:45-54; Stern, 1999:45-56; Newlove, Stern & Svedin, 2000:6). This means, 
to begin with, a careful contextualisation of the crisis to be analysed. Historical, cultural and 
political aspects are the very constituents of a particular crisis and its management. From this 
holistic basis a meticulous recollection of empirical material is the second step in order to 
accomplish a detailed reconstruction of events, as well as the crisis time frame, as perceived 
by the crisis managers. The issue of delimiting a time frame is of methodological as well as of 
theoretical importance. When starts and ends a crisis? The basic criterion for the analyst is to 
identify the initial impetus that put decision-makers at strain (Stern, 1999:45; Newlove, Stern 
& Svedin, 2000:12). This appears simple, as many crises start out as incidents, accidents, 
catastrophes or events of any kind, like for example the murder of the former Swedish prime 
Olof Palme (Hansén, 2000) or the recent earthquakes in El Salvador and India, in 2000. Also 
the closure of a crisis can be clearly defined in many cases, like the end of the MRTA hostage 
taking at the Japanese ambassadors residence in Lima, Peru (Ullberg, 1998:181). However, 
there are many crises that don’t follow this chronological pattern. There may be elements of 
escalation and de-escalation that complicate the delimitation. The so called creeping crises 
(Rosenthal, Charles & t’Hart, 1989:10) are characterised by a gradual escalation of events that 
makes difficult the definition of an actual starting point –the management of the MC wars in  
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Scandinavia is a good example (Svedin, 1998:204-239)– and other crises as well without 
fitting into this category.
1 As Eric Stern points out (1999:46), crises labelled as natural or 
technological disasters tend to de-escalate, why putting an ending point to these becomes 
difficult, as were the cases of the Chernobyl crisis in Sweden (Ibid.) and the Boliden dam 
rupture in Spain and the environmental crisis triggered (Ullberg, 2001). As a methodological 
stance I let decision-makers do the delimiting. In the Buenos Aires case the initial impetus is 
defined as the first cable failure and the fire that called for a quick solution. The ending point 
is set as the electric company’s acceptance to pay the indemnification to affected customers.  
   
What regards empirical sources, the material used are any kind of document and report 
referring to the crisis in question. When possible, qualitative fieldwork is enacted in which 
formal interviews with decision-makers and informal conversations with other persons 
involved are the main methodological devices and of singular importance. The personal –and 
subjective– experience of events and decisions that constitute the crisis, is not only a 
methodological element in this research, but is also intimately related to the theoretical 
approach to crisis management, as we shall see in next chapter. This apparently smooth first 
step, as if one just got out into the field and started recollecting 'material', does have some 
complications, however. Within a Swedish, and many other countries’, governmental 
institutional context the procedure for a state agency is to report on a contingency with some 
kind of internal investigation and producing an official report on the matter, which helps the 
scholar a lot in her/his research. There are states however, like in Argentina, where this is not 
always a legal requirement or a custom. Also in the cases where a report is written, public 
access to this is not always guaranteed.  
      
For the Buenos Aires blackout study, no governmental report of this kind has been able to 
find, except for one (1) chapter in the 1999 Annual Report of the National Electricity 
Regulation Agency (ENRE, 1999). Informal notes, resolutions and bills, expert panel reports, 
transcripts of reconciliation meetings (so called 'audiencias') and press releases have instead 
constituted the public sources. When it comes to sources from the private sector, the 
availability of published material has been scarce as well. The electric company Edesur 
dedicated only a few lines in their 1999 Annual Report (Edesur, 1999). The mass media 
coverage is normally high in any contingency, which also helps the researcher. In this case, 
                                                           
1 See for example the BSE Crisis in EU (Grönvall, 2000) and the Halland Tunnel Crisis (Kärde, forthcoming) 
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fortunately for our case, the crisis occurred in the capital city of Argentina, where a clear 
majority of the multimedia is located. This is also where the federal government institutions 
function and where the country’s financial district works. The blackout gained the attention of 
all important mass media. The phenomena of concentration of mass media and news are 
observable features of Argentinean information production. Had this power outage occurred 
in a poor Argentinean province like Jujuy, La Rioja, El Chaco or Formosa, or even in the very 
same province of Buenos Aires or in the marginalised suburbs of the Capital, it would hardly 
have gained the same proportions of media attention.  
     When it comes to interviews, for this particular study five formal interviews with decision-
makers have been accomplished. Due to changes in government it proved impossible to get in 
contact with many of the involved people. For instance, who was at the moment of the 
blackout Chief of Government of the city of Buenos Aires, Fernando De la Rúa, is today 
President of the Republic, and he also brought with him many of his collaborators from the 
local government to the national administration. Another difficulty was to meet up with the 
people from the Civil Defence of the City of Buenos Aires, since they have to be at the 
disposal of any possible emergency. The few interviews achieved were completed with 
informal conversations with different individuals involved in the crisis response, from 
institutions but also among the affected clients. Name and institutional address refer to some 
of the interviewees, while other sources are maintained concealed in line with their own 
requirements. 
      
Returning now to the research methodology. Once the reconstruction of events is 
accomplished, the third step is thus to map out the decision occasions of importance to the 
whole crisis management. As noticed above, these occasions are really the complex of events 
that in retrospect can be framed as ‘the crisis’, why the dissection of these problems to solve 
are crucial to the whole analysis. 
     The fourth and final step in the methodological procedure is putting the pieces back again 
and accomplish an analysis of a range of important aspects of the crisis management. 
Recurrent key phenomena such as problem framing, institutional co-operation and conflict, 
information processing, communication and mass media, crisis symbolics, sequencing and 
synchronicity, credibility, the role of expertise and learning processes, are analysed in this 




1.3  Organisation of the study 
This report is organised as follows: After this first introductory chapter, chapter 2 contains a 
sketch of the theoretical framework in which the analysis is accomplished. This is of 
particular interest to those scholars working in the same field of research and it is inevitably a 
core part of this whole research enterprise. In chapter 3 the social, economic, political and 
institutional context, framing and constituting the Buenos Aires blackout, is accounted for. 
Getting to the point, chapter 4 sets the stage for the case study, giving a description of the 
central actors in the crisis management. Chapter 5 outlines a brief chronology of the events. 
This is followed by the dissection of decision-making occasions in chapter 6 and by the 
thematic analysis of central phenomena in chapter 7. Finally, in chapter 8, conclusions are 
drawn and final considerations for practical purposes are presented. There are eleven (11) 
appendix attached to this report of both technical and 'layman' character, in order to illustrate 
the text.  
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2. Theoretical framework  
Crisis research, and particularly crisis decision making research, is a relatively modern field 
of study, featured by work of prominent political scientists such as Hermann (1963), Allison 
(1971), Brecher (1974), George (1980), and Vertzberger (1990) aiming at understanding 
individual and collective behaviour in security politics' crises between states. Their ideas have 
been widened by scholars like Rosenthal and t'Hart (1989,1991) to include social and 
technological catastrophes. This broader conceptualisation of 'crisis' has been further 
elaborated during the last years in case studies such as on the management of financial crises 
(Sundelius, Stern & Bynander, 1997; Stern and Sundelius, 1997), epidemics and food crises 
(Grönvall, 2000), natural hazards (Newlove, 1998; Svedin, 1999), hostage taking (Hansén, 
1998; Löfgren, 1998; Nohrstedt, 2000; Ullberg, 1998), environmental crises (Stern, 1999; 
Ullberg, 2001), and infrastructural crises (Newlove, Stern & Svedin, 2000).  
          The theoretical approach guiding this research combines notions from cognitive 
psychology and from neo-institutionalism in the social sciences, and is as such labelled a 
'cognitive-institutional approach' (Stern, 1999; Newlove, Stern & Svedin, 2000). The study 
of human cognition refers to the process of acquiring and making sense of information about 
the world; how this information is processed and acted upon, for instance by making 
decisions. A crisis situation, defined in terms of threat, limited time available and uncertainty, 
often requires quick decisions. A situation like this is likely to generate stress, which will 
impact cognitive processes (Hermann, 1979; Stern, 1999). The capacity to process 
information and make decisions under stress is likely to be altered. An overload of 
information can easily overwhelm a decision maker, why a process of 'sorting out the most 
important' tend to occur, which in the best case lead to the accurate decision in that moment, 
but which also risks to produce an inappropriate action. Stress can, in the best case, produce a 
better performance or, in the worst case, produce irritability, apathy and/or confusion. The 
cognitive approach emphasises the human representation of phenomena, that is, how a 
particular actor interprets an event. This focus concedes importance to the inherent 
subjectivity in interpreting the world. Now, this subjectivity ￿based upon beliefs, prior 
experience and expectations (Stern, 1999:33)￿ is not left solely to individual chance. 
Cognitive anthropology holds that this ￿as all human behaviour, including the cognitive 
processes￿ is socially and culturally enabled and constrained. The particular actor ￿decision- 
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maker for this case￿ thus thinks and acts within a social and cultural field,
2 of which s/he is 
the very constituent. In this particular social and cultural field ￿be it a country, a region, an 
institution, a professional or gender based community, or other￿ ideas, norms, values and 
behaviour will flow, which will shape individual perceptions and ideas (cognition) of the 
world and how to act upon it. This social and cultural approach, featured as 'structuralism',
3 
cannot end up in a deterministic fashion, however. No social or cultural field is completely 
homogeneous or static and there is always room for human agency (Giddens, 1979). It must 
be understood as a dynamic organisation of social actors in which different ideas, meanings 
and values are constantly negotiated upon (Hannerz, 1992). The point is that the subjective 
ideas and actions of a particular social actor ￿individual or collective￿ are products of these 
dynamics as, at the same time, the particular actor reproduce or transform them by agency. A 
cultural field, with its ideas and values, is thus in constant re-negotiation upon its constituents 
and subjectivity is to a large extent culturally determined (Wright, 1998). It must not be 
forgotten, however, that social actors not only constitute themselves within a specific 
institution, but also have historical and personal experiences that will have importance, as will 
personal interests. The subjective social actor does play such a significant role that it is must 
call upon our attention how social and political institutions are in fact maintained. From this 
notion interesting questions rise: Why do certain norms prevail within a particular social and 
cultural field and why do others change? Who determines these norms are reproduced or 
changed? How is this particular field organised?  
          The neo-institutional approach that has developed within the social sciences, from the 
1980's and on, shares notions with the anthropological post structural stance, although certain 
aspects may be emphasised more than others, according to each discipline's perspective.
4 This 
school of thought within the political science conceptualises [political] institutions as the 
enabling and constraining milieu wherein politics takes place, thus, according to Stern, a 
"middle ground between utilitarian rational choice perspectives and structural deterministic 
approaches to the study of public policy" (1999:36). This approach highlights concepts such 
as rules, norms and roles (see March and Olsen, 1989); historical processes and legacies (see 
Lindblom, 1990; Soltan et al, 1998); the politicisation of organisations (see Stern and 
                                                           
2 'Social and cultural field' refers to a [social and cultural] system organising social life in a community. The concept derives 
from the French sociologist Bourdieu who analyses how individuals become specific social and cultural beings through the 
acquirement of habitus within a specific social milieu; the field (Bourdieu,1985; Carle, 1988)    
3 For further reading on [symbolic] structuralist social and cultural anthropology, see for example classics such as Lévi-
Strauss, C. (1987), Dumont, L. (1965), Leach, E. (1966), and Douglas, M. (1966). Later [marxist] structuralism features 
anthropologists such as Godelier, M. (1977) and Sahlins, M. (1972) while political economic structuralism in anthropology 
has been developed by Said, E. (1979) and Mintz, S. (1974) among others. For an insightful and synthetic analysis of 
structuralism within social and cultural anthropology see Ortner,S. (1984).   
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Verbeek, eds. 1998); communication and symbolics in the study of institutional dynamics. 
Stern holds that what political/organisational neo-institutionalism focus upon are "meso-level 
social formations such as factions, groups, networks and organizations" (1999:37), which 
work as arenas and agents at the same time. Thus, from an anthropological perspective and in 
line with Stern, I see institutions as both social arenas and social actors simultaneously, where 
ideas and actions are produced and negotiated upon in order to be reproduced or transformed. 
Within the cognitive institutional approach I also emphasise the importance of the 
institutional setting for the action of the individual. A decision-maker is thus an individual 
and a collective actor at the same time, as her/his decisions are somehow a product of the 
institutional setting that s/he constitutes. Now, getting to the field of study that concerns us 
here; what implications does this approach have for the study of crises? 
     Having determined a crisis situation to be one where central values are at stake, limited 
time available and uncertainty prevailing (Sundelius, Stern & Bynander, 1997), I have 
elsewhere suggested that the nature of a crisis be socially constituted (Ullberg, 2001:9-10). 
Taking this argument to its essence, I suggest, in line with social constructivist thinkers (see 
for example Habermas, 1984-87; Foucault, 1980; Bourdieu, 1978), that there is no objective 
crisis going on ‘out there’, but that this is produced in a social context. 'A crisis' is hereby 
defined essentially as a social phenomenon. An event or sequences of them occur –incidents 
or accidents in Perrow's words (1999:63-66)– such as the sunk ferry Estonia in 1994 
(Haspers, 1998); a monetary devaluation like the devaluation of the Finnish mark in 1992 
(Sundelius, Stern & Bynander, 1997) or an assassinate like the murder of the Swedish Prime 
Minister Palme in 1986 (Hansén, 2000). In order to 'a crisis' to ‘break out’, this must be 
socially and culturally constituted by giving this particular significance or meaning to the 
incident, accident and entire situation. My standpoint is by no means deterministic, but I wish 
to emphasise what I figure is one of the central points of crises and their response: its social 
and subjective nature.  
Although there are social and political settings that determine that a state of permanent 
crisis prevails
5 I am here concerned with determined crisis situations. The lapse of time that 
constitutes the crisis can be for hours or for years, but for the sake of analysis, a time frame is 
set. While a crisis can be seen as a single problem complex, which, one way or the other, 
serves for the purpose of analysis, this is rarely the experience of the decision-makers and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 Referring to neo-institutionalism within political science, political economy, economics and sociology (Stern, 1999:36)   
5 I am particularly considering many of the so called developing countries in the world, where political, economic and social 
crises are 'normal' state of affairs where politics take place, where people fight to survive and 'uncertainty' refers to whether  
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institutions involved (Stern, 1999:42). Rather, a crisis is constituted by sequences of problems 
to solve and of decisions to make, which can follow one after another or be at stake at the 
same point of time (Ibid. 42-43). Under time pressure and lack of predictability, the crisis 
situation can be seen as an altered state of things. Viewing such a particular setting with this 
theoretical framework in mind one must ask oneself what happens to human cognition and 
institutional dynamics under such conditions? Are chaos and a general disorder to expect, or 
are organisation of institutions (social and/or governmental) maintained, and if so, how do 
they function under such circumstances? These are vital issues to scrutinise in the 
management of a crisis. Mary Douglas, one of the most prominent British social 
anthropologists during the last half of the XX century, has studied the constitution of 
institutions (1986). She argues that "crisis behaviour depends on what patterns of justice have 
been internalized, what institutions have been legitimated." (Ibid. 122). She exemplifies her 
discussion with situations of famine, in which intentions of equal distribution of food supplies 
on part of international relief agencies is subverted by local institutions. Normally 
marginalised sectors of society were again the least prioritised. Another social anthropologist 
could observe, in a famine situation where foreign relief was not available, that the 
community in crisis, rather than suffering a collapse of conventions, switched from a regular 
set of principles to a regular set of emergency norms (Torry, 1986). Thus, according to 
Douglas and Torry's observations, the crisis did not provoke rupture of the social organisation 
of institutions; rather these were modified with the situation. While their standpoint is in my 
view too a structuralistic one and should be criticised for leaving hardly any space for human 
agency, it does emphasise the importance of the reproduction of institutions also in what 
appears to be a virtual chaos. Crisis situations in society, in fact, demand decisions, individual 
as well as collective, and these are essentially produced by and within social and political 
institutions. Decision-making constitutes the very core part of the crisis management, since 
they determine human action. While some decision makers have to ￿or want to￿ stand front 
and assume decision responsibility alone, according to the cognitive institutional approach 
here applied, neither the decision makers nor their decisions are made in an individual 
vacuum. The institution with its ideas and norms, constituting a social field at a meso level, 
will to a large extent shape the decision, as will those at the micro level, referring to small 
groups (Stern, 1999:57-82). Literature on crisis decision making indicate the 'small group' 
￿be it a crisis committee, a cabinet, a council, or a commission￿ play an important role in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
there will be food on the table that day or whether the structural adjustments applied will be enough to qualify for new 
multilateral loans.    
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this process (Ibid. 57). The dynamics in a 'small group' and between several 'small groups' are 
likely to "profoundly affect the decision maker's view of their situation, it's possibilities, 
constraints, and imperatives." (Ibid. 58). In line with George (1997:44-50) I see 'small groups' 
as constituents of a broader social field, why the 'small group' and the decisions made by it 
must be analysed with reference to the institution/s of which it is part. These 'small groups' 
can be found, not only at top level in an institutional decision making structure, but also at 
other levels. A distinction can be made between the operational and the strategic levels of 
decision-making and where small groups can be found and decisions can be made. ‘Strategic’ 
decisions refer to those typically made at the top-levels by politicians and chiefs of bureau. 
‘Operational’ decisions are those normally made by technicians and middle chiefs (‘t Hart, 
Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:25-28).     
Now, decisions are not just a product of institutional setting and group dynamics, they are 
also products of an ocean of specificities. They are made by specific decision makers upon 
specific upcoming problems at a particular point of time; the decision makers form part of 
specific institutional settings in which specific ideas and norms shape their actions; these 
institutions work as specific social actors interacting with other actors, which forge 
themselves within larger social and political complexes such as regions and nation states with 
specific cultural and historical features. Is it then possible to generalise upon all these 
variables? Maybe is this a dilemma to all social sciences, which are dealing with such 
complex, dynamic and many times abstract phenomena as are society and societies. I believe, 
however, that there are many conjunctures, cases compared, from which conclusions can be 
drawn, and although preliminary ￿defining also 'science' and 'knowledge' as social fields that 
are in permanent discussion￿ these can help us to understand better how crises are managed. 
This way practitioners and scholars dealing with these issues can join efforts in order to 
ameliorate crisis preparedness.                  
 
 
3.   Contextualising the Buenos Aires Blackout  
3.1  Locating the Scene of Events 
The Argentine Republic is one of the largest countries on the South American continent, both 
in geographical extension and in population. Its territory covers approximately 3 millions km
2 
from the Antarctic in the south to tropical Chaco up north, from the Atlantic coast in the east  
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and the Andes mountain range in the west, where nearly 37 millions of people habit
6. 63% of 
this number live in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Santa Fe while the mayor 
concentration of inhabitants, approximately 33,5% of the total population, is found in Gran 
Buenos Aires, that is, the city and suburbs of Buenos Aires (see Appendix I). Urbanisation 
processes in Argentina had its peak in the 1970's due to industrialisation processes, an 
increase that slowed down in subsequent decades. The rural Argentina, with its extensive land 
and agro export based economy, is still transforming into an urban society (see Appendix II) 
due to contemporaneous economic and political development. Small farmers and cattle raisers 
have increasing difficulties to sustain small-scale enterprises in competition with large 
economic groups that produce and sell to a cheaper price. Emigration to an uncertain 
economic and social future in the outskirts of a mayor city is thus the only alternative for 
many of these small-scale farmers and cattle raisers. Urban immigration puts existing 
infrastructure at strain and particularly if this is deficient already. As I shall develop below, 
the electric network in the City of Buenos Aires was until the 1990s deficient in service due to 
lack of maintenance and technological investments. The existing electricity capacity was thus 
not enough for the growing number of inhabitants.   
     Buenos Aires is, as demographic numbers indicate, a huge city. The Capital Federal is, as 
noted above, not only the country’s capital city and the centre of national politics and 
commerce, but is also the core part of the city. Unlike urban centres like those of Auckland 
and Stockholm, where the core parts of these cities are constituted by offices, shops and 
institutional buildings (Newlove, Stern & Svedin, 2000:19-21), the City of Buenos Aires 
(Capital Federal) hosts nearly three millions inhabitants spread out over the whole area.
7 This 
means that also in the commercial and political quarters of the city there are neighbours next 
door and there is, in fact, a quite picturesque mélange between different buildings, ways of 
life and daily activities. The blackout in 1999 meant, thus, that an important amount of the 
affected customers were households.   
          Argentina is a federal republic since 1816 when the country formally accomplished 
independence from the Spanish crown. 24 provinces constitute the republic and these enjoy a 
relative degree of political and administrative autonomy in relation to the Republic. The 
Federal Capital, the core city of Buenos Aires, was earlier a municipality within the Province 
of Buenos Aires. In 1994, within the Federal Constitutional Reform, however, the 
                                                           
6 According to the preliminary numbers of the 2001 National Census the total population in Argentina was 36.027.041 (El 
Diario de la República, 24 November 2001). Account and analysis of this census is currently underway. 
7 According to the preliminary numbers of the 2001 National Census the population in Capital Federal was 2.729.469 (El 
Diario de la República, 24 November 2001). Account and analysis of this census is currently underway.  
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Municipality of the City of Buenos Aires was reconstituted as an Autonomous City
8 and as 
such it does no longer form part of this province. Instead it constitutes a proper political and 
administrative jurisdiction, as if it would be a province. 
     In a Latin-American context, Argentina has, during the 20
th century, been characterised as 
something of an economic and social exception compared to other countries in the region. It 
has been, on the one hand, an economically prosperous country, one of the world’s greatest 
exporters’ of grain, meat and wool. The country has an important infrastructure, mainly due to 
foreign investments. The social politics during the last century have aimed at becoming a 
welfare state and thus statistics on poverty and infant mortality have been low, comparing to 
the rest of Latin America. On the other hand, a review (Keen, B.1996: 305-326) of Argentine 
economic history in the 20
th Century reminds us of stagnation interspersed with periods of 
depression and runaway inflation. Military coups, social turbulence and brutal repression have 
been a constant feature of the country’s politics, of which the last military dictatorship 1976-
1983 was one of the most violent.  
     Since 1983 democracy is installed in the country. All representatives are elected every four 
years
9, from municipality level up to presidency at the national level. The sitting President De 
la Rúa from the liberal coalition the 'Alianza' who was governing the fourth consecutive 
mandate of democracy
10, renounced on Christmas Eve to his post after serious street riots and 
civil disturbances in Buenos Aires and other important cities in the country, due to the deep 
social and economic crisis the country is currently suffering. The legislative assembly in 
Congress thus voted that the Peronist Party's Adolfo Rodriguez Saa, Governor of the inland 
province of San Luís, assume mandate until elections in March 2002. While Rodriguez Saa 
immediately pronounced measures such as ceasing the payments of the foreign debt and 
reducing the salaries of the political representatives, new street riots only a few days later 
made the new president abdicate by New Years Eve. At the moment of writing this Senator 
Eduardo Duhalde, former Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, has been voted in 
Congress to govern the country until elections in 2003. This severe social, political and 
economic crisis, albeit in many ways related to the blackout crisis, is beyond the scope of this 
particular study, however. Its' magnitude and severity deserves an analysis of its own.   
 
                                                           
8 Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires 
9 A reform in 1994, by the sitting president Menem, changed the previous principle of six years mandates as was 
implemented the possibility of re-election.    
10 The presidents in the last decades of democracy have been Alfonsín (1983-1989), Menem (1989-1995 and 1995-1999) and 
De la Rúa (1999-)  
Página 18 
 
3.2  A closer looks at contemporaneous Argentinean economic & political history
11 
Argentina is a multi facetted country in many ways. Counting with important natural 
resources such as oil, mineral, wood, fertile soil, variety of climates, high productive 
coastline, and important export industries like meat, wool, leather, fruit, vegetables, and wine, 
make many Argentineans claim the country ought to be –if not prosperous– at least not 
among the developing countries. The equation is obviously much more complex, but there is a 
grain of truth in this reasoning. The problem of distribution of resources is but one 
explanation to this problem although a very historical root to this social and economic pattern. 
The post war economic boom in Argentina during the government of Juan Domingo Perón 
permitted the rural economy to slowly initiate an industrialisation process. While the 
intentions were good, the agriculture was still the base for this development. Lack of 
technological development for industrialisation, summoned a latifundio rural economy,
12 set 
the structural framework for the economic problems in Argentina. Military governments and 
chronic economic fluctuations characterised the Cold War period in the country. Periods of 
rapid economic growth were followed by acute depressions, wiping out any previous gains 
and generating runaway inflation. Succeeding the nationalist ideology and import 
substitutions politics of the Perón era, the 1955-1973 governments opened the doors to 
foreign investments by removing all restrictions on profit remittances and stimulating 
industrial denationalisation through devaluation. The military junta that took power 1976 
applied a free market economy letting importation free by eliminating import tariffs, which 
lead many of the national corporations to go bankrupt. Again economic growth fluctuated 
wildly; real wages fell and by June 1982 the annual inflation rate reached 500 percent. With 
the last military junta, Argentina’s foreign debt grew from US$ 8.000 millions in 1975 to 
45.000 millions in 1983 (Calcagno & Calcagno, 2000). Two central factors in this process are 
important to emphasise. On the one hand, the OPEC countries and the international financial 
system of the time needed countries where to place surplus and Argentina was not late to 
accept the offer. On the other hand, the economic policy of the military junta produced a 
national capital flight from the country, which meant reduced international reserves and 
consequently an increase in state debt. When foreign bank interests increased there were no 
funds to pay the debt amortisation and not to mention the augmented bank interests. On top of 
                                                           
11 Keen,B (1996) if otherwise not stated 
12 The ‘latifundio economy’, a historical feature of Latin America in general and as such a legacy of the Spanish colonisation, 
is based on great estates of agriculture and cattle raising, and in which land ownership is distributed between a few wealthy 
owners, a species of land monopoly. One argentine estancia [ranch] can be as large as several thousands of hectares and the 
estanciero [owner] runs the property with poorly paid peon labour. For further reading see for example Keen, B. (1996), 
Rock, D. (1985), Diaz, A. (1970)   
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that, the Argentinean State implemented a system of exchange insurance for private 
companies that ended up with the state assuming their debts. After the disastrous Malvinas –
or Falklands– war the junta had to yield power to a civilian government in 1983, which was to 
be presided by Raúl Alfonsín from the Radical Party (Unión Cívica Radical). While he, 
during his mandate, had to attain to restore a fragile democracy and heal the social and 
political wounds of the extremely violent dictatorship, the economic crisis only worsened. 
Inflation soared and reached 1,500 percent in 1985. The situation was to be remedied with the 
so called Austral plan establishing wage and price controls, changing the currency peso for 
the austral, and reducing public expenses. The situation was stabilised for a moment but the 
Argentinean economy was profoundly wounded. The national industry was by then 
technologically backward and there was a high dependency on primary export markets with 
low prices. By 1989 the GDP had fallen more than 15 percent since 1981. Upon ‘counsel’ of 
the IMF, Alfonsín resorted to traditional conservative measures seeking to push exports and 
enacting austerity measures. Without such, no new multilateral loans would be available. The 
complete lack of available capital for development contributed to deterioration of 
infrastructure, including energy rationing through long daily rotating power cuts. A profound 
recession with a declining production and annual inflation rates of 12,000 percent with prices 
rising several times a day, burst out in food riots in supermarkets all over the country, to 
which the government responded with a nation-wide state of emergency and a banning of 
strikes and demonstrations. Alfonsín decided in July 1989 to hand over government five 
months in advance to the newly elected president: the governor from the province of La Rioja, 
Carlos Menem.       
       
3.3  Economic reforms in Argentina – the Menem era 
The relatively unknown governor Menem, who represented the Peronist party, had won the 
elections through a highly populist campaign and vague promises of a productive revolution. 
While the Peronist party traditionally allied with the worker class and practically controlled 
labour unions, Menem implemented, against all expectations, a thoroughgoing neoliberal 
economic programme, including several conservative ministers in his cabinet of which some 
represented powerful multinationals and were related to the important Argentine agricultural 
oligarchy. A programme for privatisation of state owned companies was announced; 
thousands of employees in public administration were dismissed and government spending 
drastically reduced. The shock therapy of the Menem government and the authoritative 
'executive-decree-politics' on part of the president, accomplished to divide the labour  
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movement and to weaken the unions. In order to succeed with the stability goal of economy, 
the currency –now peso again– was made convertible in relation to the US dollar
13 and further 
government budget cuts were made, reducing expenses in health, education, welfare and 
pensions. The fiscal orthodoxy was rewarded by the IMF with the so called Brady Plan 
refinancing part of the argentine foreign debt, that by 1991 had reached almost US$ 60 
millions, while under- and unemployment grew steadily and other social indicators pointed at 
increased poverty. The removal of tariff barriers opened the doors to a flood of cheap import 
products to which national industry could not compete and therefore declined further. The 
argentine agro industry also suffered a crisis, as low international prices, declining markets 
and the high cost of agricultural credits reigned. Any protests against this harsh economic 
policy was responded by the Menem government as being ‘acts of subversive agitators’ and 
through augmented budgets to security forces in order to ‘control activities of disintegrative 
elements’. Menem accomplished a constitutional reform to permit presidential re-election and 
was re-elected in 1995. The Menem government propaganda recurrently reminded the 
Argentineans of the hyperinflation during the Alfonsín era, inciting the people to cherish 
stability (and Menem government). By this argument this economic policy continued while 
social costs augmented. This made social and political protests grow. There was, by the end of 
the 1990s, no more state companies left to sell out; the foreign debt had reached the sum of 
US$ 144.657 millions (Calcagno & Calcagno, 2000:4) and the argentine population suffered 
the harsh consequences of Menem politics. Summoned to this were the corruption scandals 
that had followed the Menem administration from the beginning but that became more and 
more obvious and stunning each time. When Fernando De la Rúa, representing an alliance of 
centre-right wing parties called the Alianza, ran for the 1999 elections, this was exactly what 
got him to power. The Argentineans were fed up with impunity. The economic situation in 
Argentina is until this day very strained and neoliberal economic policy continues its course. 
Poverty keeps increasing and the large Argentinean middle class is vanishing. The increase of 
urban violence is just one symptom of this social and political situation. Buenos Aires is 
particularly suffering these problems and the Buenos Aires inhabitants live with their nerve 
tense. While a power outage might seem a triviality in the light of these mayor political, 
economic and social problems, the 1999 blackout in the middle of summer heat was rather the 
straw that broke the camel's back for the already stressed Porteños.
14            
                                                           
13 1 US dollar is equivalent to 1 Argentinean peso with the argentine currency tied to the North American currency's 
fluctuations.  





3.4  Privatisation processes and reform of Argentinean electricity sector  
Linked to this economic and political process are privatisation of state companies and 
structural adjustments of the state. This formula is a remedy not only applied in Argentina, 
but in many other countries. In the case of Argentina it was strongly advised by the IMF as a 
means of acceding to new credits. The process of privatisation in Argentina was initiated with 
President Menem and was rather hastily performed, clearly favouring large economic groups. 
Companies such as ENTEL (the telephone company), Aerolíneas Argentinas (the national 
airline), SEGBA (Buenos Aires electricity company) were sold out in a ‘fire-sale’ manner, 
being sold for fractions of their net worth. The arguments for this procedure were that the 
state companies counted for permanent losses for the state and were extremely inefficient. But 
even YPF, the state oil company, was sold out this manner, in spite of being a profitable 
company with high assets and projected revenues (Keen, 1996:324).  
     The political discourse of 'the inefficient state’ justified most of the deregulation in the 
sector of public services and infrastructure. In Argentina, thus, complete railways, roads and 
highways, airports, telecommunications, water provision, gas and oil and electricity were 
privatised in the 1990s. This has meant a reduction in state expenses for Argentina, which was 
the purpose, but also large sectors of dismissed public service employees and subsequent 
social problems (and costs for the state) due to this. By the time these employees were 
dismissed the entire job market was being reduced and rates of unemployment increasing as 
Argentinean economy was declining.  
     The Argentinean electricity sector was re-structured in 1991 and 1992. Parliament law 
24.065, known as the ‘Regulation Framework for Electricity’, establishes the legal norms for 
this re-structuration process (Chambers of Deputies, Official Bulletin, 16 January 1992, p.30). 
The electric sector was divided into three vertical segments: generation, transmission and 
distribution of electric energy. The legal framework also set the criteria for the privatisation of 
the state companies in these segments. There are services –suck as those of electricity, gas and 
water provision– that are considered ‘natural monopolies’ within this framework (Thwaites 
Rey, López & Felder, 1999: 12). That is, the features of the activity are such that the technical 
costs of letting several companies offer the same service in the same area is too expensive. 
While 'the monopoly' is normally associated with 'the state', supposing politics is the medium 
for this, it is in this case 'the market' itself that sets the limits, due to the costs. Thus, the 
energy sector is prone to be monopolised in this sense, private or public. This is particularly 
the state of being in the provinces and in the regions of low population density. In the city of  
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Buenos Aires, the electric company SEGBA
15 was, between February and July 1992, divided 
into seven commercial units; four companies for generation and three for distribution. One of 
the latter was EDESUR S.A., Empresa Distribuidora de Electricidad Sur, Sociedad Anónima. 
One of the political arguments for the privatisation of SEGBA was the frequency in power 
cuts when this state company provided electricity in Buenos Aires, particularly in the 1980's. 
Through privatisation the outages would be eradicated and service in general would be 
infinitely better, which measures of the frequency of power interruptions indicate it has (see 
Appendix III). When the EDESUR blackout occurred in 1999, however, the issue of 
privatisation and quality of service became again centre of discussion. The harshest critics on 
EDESUR argued that in line with the interests of the private company, the reduction of staff 
and of materiel, in order to reduce costs and increase profit margins, had sacrificed quality 
and security (Zlotogwiazda & Klipphan, 1999:8-13). 
     The regulation frameworks for all privatised public services designate so called Regulation 
Bodies, which are the state agencies that are to control the performance and the product of the 
private company in regard. The Argentinean electric sector is currently supervised by a 
national agency, the ENRE,
16 and there are also eleven regulation bodies in some of the 
provinces. The only partial implementation of the regulatory agencies is due to the political 
and legislative autonomy that the Argentinean provinces enjoy. Not all of them, in fact a 
majority, have considered it necessary, or have they not afforded to implement such a 
controlling body into their provincial state structure after the federal privatisation reform. The 
ENRE, as shall be accounted for in what follows, is federal and works in all provinces in 
matters of generation and transport of energy, not so when it comes to distribution of 
electricity however.   
     A closer description of EDESUR and of the ENRE and its functions follows. 
 
 
4.   On the stage  
On the following pages I will account briefly for the different actors that participated in the 
management of this power outage crisis. This overview concludes with a list of acronyms, 
which will help the reader to remember the different institutions involved. 
 
                                                           
15 SEGBA = Servicios Eléctricos de Gran Buenos Aires [Electrical Services of Buenos Aires]  
16 Ente Nacional Reguladora de Electricidad [National Regulation Agency of Electricity]   
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4.1  Central Actors in the Buenos Aires Blackout 
The crisis management of the power outage in Buenos Aires involved principally three 
different organisational actors.  
      
4.1.1  Edesur   
On the one hand the electric company, Edesur, carried responsibility for the accident and was 
the sole unit to re-establish service. This took eleven days before light was totally back in the 
affected parts of the city. As above stated, Edesur is one of the three electric distribution 
companies in the City of Buenos Aires with its surroundings.
17 When SEGBA was privatised 
in 1991-92, the electric supply to the city was split into three operative areas that 
corresponded to these three different companies. The areas were separated through 
imaginative limits through the city, but also in practice the distribution systems within the 
same city were technically separated (see Appendix IV), obstructing any possible 
reconnection (Interview with Mr Alberto Devoto, Vice-president ENRE). This technical 
feature actually meant, for the crisis management in the Edesur 1999 outage, that the other 
two companies could not 'help Edesur out' by connecting to their systems, as these were 
interrupted.   
     The Argentinean State founded Edesur as a stock company and majorities of its shares 
were sold through an international public contest. In August 1992 a contract for 51% of the 
shares was signed between the Argentinean State and the Chilean-Argentinean consortium 
Distrilec Inversora S.A. paying above US$ 500 millions for these shares (Edesur, 1999:8). 
Major transnational companies in the electricity market, such as Chilectra and Endesa set up 
the consortium from Chile together with Endesa from Spain, PSI and TAICO, and the local 
Perez Companc. The Argentinean Government kept at first 39% of the shares, but sold them 
off in 1995 to one of the shareholders, leaving the National Bank with only 10% of stock in 
1999. The contract for concession is valid until August 2087, that is, for 95 years (Ibid: 37). 
Edesur in 1999 supplied 2.105.380 customers in an area of 3.309 km
2 in the southern part of 
the city of Buenos Aires and another twelve departments in the southern part of the province 
of Buenos Aires (Ibid: 9). Edesur is operated in Buenos Aires but is ultimately run from 
Enersis in the neighbouring country, which in turn is controlled by the Spanish Endesa since 
March 1999. The Edesur decision-making organisation is a vertical structure entailing a board 
of directors with a president and eight directors on the top followed by a general manager, 
                                                           




communication manager and environmental manager. At the bottom are seven subdirectories 
attending legal assessment; human resources; commercialisation; distribution; services; 
economic planning; administration and finances.      
 
4.1.2 ENRE   
On the other hand were in the crisis management involved national governmental authorities. 
The National Regulation Agency, ENRE, was constituted in April 1993, eight months after 
the privatisation process of the electric market. ENRE has a federal competence in matters of 
generation and transport of energy, while in matters of distribution its competence is only 
valid for the former SEGBA area, that is, in Buenos Aires (see Appendix IV) (Interview with 
Mr Alberto Devoto, Vice-president ENRE). The ENRE is an administrative institution, and 
thus its staff is mainly constituted by white-collar professionals but also by technicians (Ibid.). 
A five-person board of directors, headed formally by a president and a vice president, conduct 
the organisation. In practice this board of directors works as an equal team, however, and all 
five members have decision-making authority (Ibid.). ENRE, together with the national 
Secretariat of Energy and Mining worked as regulators of the legal framework for the crisis 
management of the power outage. In theory, the ENRE is a state agency with administrative 
autonomy that has to balance the private companies’ interests in profits against the quality of 
service to the customers. This is accomplished by controlling that the companies fulfil with 
the contract of concession and, in case they do not, by applying sanctions. As I shall account 
for below, the procedure is one of evaluating and eventually sanctioning on a six-month basis 
once 'the harm is done'. This routine manner would be of importance for the crisis 
development in this case, since the political establishment and the public opinion perceived 
that the ENRE was 'doing nothing' when the agency was actually acting in accordance with 
routine procedure. The ENRE has neither legislative nor any policy making power, however, 
which entails the agency with a certain degree of political dependency in practice. The 
political decision-making regarding the electric market is done at the Secretariat of Energy 
and Mining within the Ministry of Economy. In this crisis the ENRE operated as the nexus 
between the national government and Edesur.   
      
4.1.3  Government of the City of Buenos Aires  
Also on the governmental part, the local government of the City of Buenos Aires with its 
Civil Defence was active in the crisis management. The City of Buenos Aires hosts the capital 
city of the republic, the so-called 'Capital Federal'. The city of Buenos Aires is one of the  
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largest on the whole continent with its 15 millions of inhabitants, geographically located in 
the province with the same name. Only the core part of the city constitutes the Capital 
Federal, however. It is judicially equivalent to a province according the Argentine 
Constitution of 1994 and thus provides it with the right to an own government: Gobierno de 
la Ciudad de Buenos Aires [GCBA] (The Government of the City of Buenos Aires).  The 
extensive suburbs surrounding the city, where the majority of the population lives, belong 
administratively to the Government of the Province of Buenos Aires. In spite of a rather small 
territory and only some three millions of inhabitants, Capital Federal is no doubt the capital 
city where financial and political power of the whole country operates.  
          When the blackout occurred in 1999 the GCBA concentrated on palliating the social 
situation, helping the affected institutions and inhabitants by supplying water, ice, electric 
generators. The Defensa Civil [DC] (Civil Defence) of the GCBA was the main operative 
actor in this work, co-ordinating the tasks of the GCBA departments involved, such as the 
Health Secretariat, but also with external actors like the Army Forces and the hospitals. As we 
shall see, the local government and its Chief of Government also engaged in the crisis 
management. This was a crisis for large parts of the Capital Federal population for whom the 
government was responsible and thus a complex of decision-making problems for the 
government. 1999 was also the year for presidential elections to which the GCBA Chief of 
Government, Fernando De la Rúa, was one of the main candidates. The crisis was thus 
simultaneously a window of opportunity for De la Rúa's campaign.    
 
4.1.4   Civil Defence in Argentina and in the City of Buenos Aires 
The history of the institution of Civil Defence in Argentina goes back to the late 1960's. The 
idea of a defence for civilians in war gained support in the world after the Second World War. 
In Argentina this idea was incorporated into the Military Defence as a division called Defensa 
Antiaérea Pasiva Territorial [Territorial Passive Non Air Defence] (Buenos Aires Civil 
Defence, 1989). In 1968 this division was incorporated into the Ministry of Defence and in 
1969 it officially took the name 'Defensa Civil'. In 1996 the National Agency of Civil Defence 
was transferred from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of National Affairs [Ministerio 
del Interior] and located within the administration of the Secretariat of Internal Security 
(Dirección Nacional de Políticas de Seguridad y Protección Civil, 2001).  
          The 'Dirección General de Emergencias Sociales y Defensa Civil' (DC) is the Civil 
Defence Agency of the City of Buenos Aires was created in 1981 through Law by Decree 
22.418 (Argentine Legislation Annuals, 1981) during the last de facto government (1976-83).  
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The head of the agency is the Chief of Government of the City of Buenos Aires, while a 
General Director runs the agency. It is the Chief of Government who declares, if necessary, a 
state of emergency, and who determines formal disaster areas on recommendation from the 
General Director. The Civil Defence in the City of Buenos Aires is the institution in charge of 
all emergency measures in Capital Federal. Through its Emergency Operations Centre 
[Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia] the DC co-ordinates all emergency operations 
entailed by other public organisations such as S.A.M.E.,
18 the Fire Brigades,
19 Secretariat of 
Environmental Control, including the private companies that are in concession of the public 
services.  The DC also co-ordinate operations with the Armed Forces, the Federal Police, the 
Buenos Aires Police, and the Gendarmery, in case Civil Defence calls upon them. As we shall 
see below, all these organisations participated in the palliating work during the 1999 blackout. 
A state of emergency can be declared once the "disaster excels the resources of the affected 
area" (Government of the Argentine Republic, June 18, 1982. Article 60). There was no state 
of emergency declared in the Edesur power outage, however. One reason was that there was 
never a situation of chaos during the blackout, nor were the City of Buenos Aires 
Government's resources ever excelled. Also the 'short term perspective' that prevailed among 
all involved actors during the first week of the power outage, may have determined the 
absence of a declared state of emergency - everybody expected the problem to be solved 
immediately.      
 
4.2  List of Acronyms 
DC   Defensa Civil        [Civil  Defence] 
 
Edesur   Empresa Distribuidora de Electricidad Sur       [Electricity Distribution  
Company South] 
 
ENRE    Ente Nacional Reguladora de Electricidad       [National Regulating 
Agency of  
           E l e c t r i c i t y ]  
 




                                                           
18 S.A.M.E. Sistema de Atención Médica de Emergencia [System of Medical Atention in Emergencies] is the emergency 
health organisation within the Government of the City of Buenos Aires, depending of the Secretariat of Health. S.A.M.E. 
attends all individual and collective medical emergencies in the City of Buenos Aires, and is in charge of sanitary 
organisation in the case of a disaster with human victims.  
19 In Argentina there are two classes of Fire Brigades [bomberos]. The 'professional' corps' belong to the Federal Police, 
while the other is based on civil organisation and 'volunteer firemen'.    
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SEGBA  Servicios Eléctricos de Gran Buenos Aires      [Electric Services of 
Buenos  
Aires and Suburbs] 
 
SEM   Secretaría de Energía y Minería         [Secretariat of Energy and  
Mining] 
 
4.3  Values in Play 
Having defined the central actors let me now take a concrete look on their involvement in this 
infrastructural crisis. Which were the values at stake for them? As crisis management research 
has shown (‘t Hart, 1993:40), a crisis can be as much a threat as an opportunity, depending on 
the circumstances and the actor involved and thus subjectively determined.  
     Let me begin with the affected customers. They are for our case here not analysed as an 
actor in its own right, but are surely vital in the crisis dynamics. As emphasised in the 
Auckland power outage (Newlove, Stern & Svedin, 2000:163-164), the 'victims' can very well 
be crisis copers. A power outage in an electricity dependant society, such as the majority of 
all modern urban settings, has severe social consequences. No electricity means no light in 
houses, commercial or institutional buildings; no elevators in tall buildings nor water for 
drinking or sewage in these (as pumps are electrically driven); no air conditioning or heating 
(where this latter is electrically provided); no cooking possibilities (where the stove is 
electric); no computers to run transactions in banks, shops, supermarkets or to accomplish 
tasks in state administration; no electrically driven transport (subway and train); no gasoline 
(where pumps are electrically driven) for other means of transport; no traffic lights; no 
industrial production. In short, the modern city is highly electricity dependant and the lack of 
energy severely affects social, political and economic life, as we can currently observe in the 
state of California (USA), where the high consumption of electricity is an important political 
problem. A power outage, thus, if it endures, can transform into a virtual chaos.  
     In the Buenos Aires blackout, for the households, a range of values were thus at stake: 
daily routine (work, meals and so on), health, hygiene, mental well being, vicinity relations, 
and not to mention monthly budgets, as having to buy food instead of cooking, which is 
substantially more expensive, or having to travel to relatives or friends in other parts of this 
extensive city in order to take a shower in suffocating summer heat, and other costs. For the 
affected corporate clients, this was principally an economical issue. The many food stores and 
restaurants losing possibilities to refrigerate food. Banks with computerised systems were 
unable to operate by which money would not circulate and subsequently, for the bank, profit 
would be lost. The same threatened to happen to other businesses, as people would buy less.  
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These negative effects could only be balanced with economic compensations, for which 
strove the institutionalised civil actors: the consumers' organisations and the Ombudsmen. For 
NGOs such as the consumers defence associations ADELCO
20 and ADECUA,
21 this case was 
undoubtedly an opportunity to gain attention for their cause.      
     In the context of privatisation, one of the principal pro-privatisation arguments was that of 
quality and efficiency of public service. Edesur had accomplished recent investments in order 
to fulfil this 'promise'. The substation Azopardo Nueva, for which the connection tests that 
caused the power outage were made, was one of these and its inauguration was to be a symbol 
of Edesur quality and efficiency (see Appendix V). The blackout certainly threatened to 
darken this image of the company, as would the entire management of the situation, which 
was to reveal severe inefficiencies in the corporate organisation. Now, not only the Edesur 
reputation was at stake. The many shareholders (Enersis, Chilectra, ENDESA and others) 
were powerful companies constantly searching for new investment opportunities. A 'bad' 
crisis management would not speak well of their capacity either, nor in technical matters 
(How could it happen?) neither in financial solidity. The power outage was not only a threat 
to loss of reputation, but also a huge loss in money for Edesur and its shareholders. Finally, as 
the crisis developed the very ownership of Edesur was threatened, as the terms of the contract 
with the Argentinean state considered situations when service was not fulfilled, which legally 
sustained the state's right to abolish ownership of shares and sell them again.  
     To the argentine state, embodied in the National Government and the electricity-regulating 
agency, ENRE, the power outage put their management capacity at stake. For the Menem 
administration it was a matter of politics, as the privatisation was a product of this 
government, and the blackout occurred in the midst of the internal campaigns for presidential 
candidates that same year. The blackout in itself was thus a negative impact for President 
Menem and his government, which worsened as the days passed by without solution. As the 
public claims for justice and economic compensation increased, the already pressed public 
finances feared having to indemnify all affected customers. A well-performed management on 
part of the government, however, would serve as a card in the presidential campaigns. The 
state representative, the regulating ENRE, therefore played an important role for the Menem 
government. It was at the same time justifying its very existence. This public agency was 
negotiating the performance of Edesur and if this was not satisfactorily accomplished, there 
                                                           
20 ADELCO = Acción Del Consumidor [Action of the Consumer] 
21 ADECUA = Asociación de Consumidores y Usuarios en la Argentina [Association of Consumers and Clients in   




was an overhanging risk the agency would be 're-structured' into another kind of regulating 
agency.  
          The Buenos Aires Government, GCBA, and the Civil Defence, DC, were not only 
defending the well being of their affected inhabitants, but also their political reputation. The 
GCBA head, De la Rúa, was running for president in that year's elections, why a good 
performance in the crisis management would provide him with the opportunity to gain 






During the first weeks of February Edesur is making transmission tests in the new substation 
Azopardo Nueva that is to be inaugurated during this month.  
Monday, February 15  
At 3.14 a.m. in the substation Azopardo Nueva the connection between oil cables 135 and 453 
at 132 kV fails (see Appendix VI). As a consequence of this connection failure, a fire starts in 
the substation. The fire extends over the whole basement in the substation, setting fire also to 
other cables. While the fire is soon under control, electric supply of high tension is interrupted 
to the substations Pozos,
23 Once
24 and Independencia,
25 affecting 156.540 customers
26 in 
Capital Federal; households, shops, banks, restaurants, public service (see Appendix VII). 
Also the underground and traffic lights are out of function.  
     Edesur informs in the morning that service will be re-established within the course of that 
same day. Technicians of the company work all day on a solution, while provisory measures 
are taken to reduce the number of affected customers. In the afternoon Edesur informs that 
total service will be re-established within the next 48 hours. By night the number of affected 
customers is down at 60.000 through connection to medium tension network.  
Tuesday, February 16 
                                                           
22 The chronology is reconstructed through different sources such as the newspaper Clarín; EDESUR documents; ENRE 
documents; journals Veintiuno and Imagen; interviews with involved crisis managers, if otherwise not stated.   
23 The name of the substation 'Pozos' refers to the Battle at Pozos in 1826 between Argentinean land forces and attacking 
Brazilian vessels intending invasion from the Rio de la Plata.    
24 'Once' means eleven (11) in Spanish. The name of the substation refers to September 11; death anniversary of Domingo 
Faustino Sarmiento, Argentine President between 1868-74 and generally considered the founding father of the public school 
in Argentina. 
25 The name of the substation 'Independencia' [independence] refers to the country's emancipation from the Spanish Crown 
and the creation of the Argentine Republic in 1816. 
26 One (1) customer equals approximately four (4) inhabitants in Buenos Aires (Interview with A. Devoto ENRE), which 
means an estimated number of 626.000 affected inhabitants at the first moment.   
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60.000 customers remain without electricity and Edesur keeps working on a technical 
solution. This is the warmest day in Buenos Aires so far and people are suffering the lack of 
water, elevators, refrigerators and air conditioning. The company informs through a press 
release that by Wednesday electricity will be re-established. In the evening, six new cables are 
connected in Azopardo Nueva to be executed next morning. 
Wednesday, February 17 
At noon the re-connection is executed from substation Once, charging 200kV to cable 453 
during 15 minutes (see Appendix VIII). One of the cables fails again, however. Edesur 
informs that electric supply will not be total until Thursday. The local authorities of the 
GCBA entail an emergency plan in order to assist the affected inhabitants when necessary. 
The regulating ENRE dictates Resolution 222/99 (ENRE, 1999), which charges Edesur for 
the occurred and instructs the company to pay indemnities to the affected customers. By night 
the number of affected customers is 55.000 (see Appendix IX) and demonstrations are held on 
the street, claiming for electric supply.  
Thursday, February 18 
Due to the second cable failure Edesur informs through a press release in the morning that a 
restoration of electric supply will be delayed another 24 hours. In the evening the Edesur 
General Director receives some journalists from the most important news media and promises 
a total electric supply by Friday. Edesur representatives also participate in two major TV 
programmes. In the evening two cables are connected satisfactorily. Remaining four 
connections are prepared for energising. A lawyer denounces ENRE authorities in a Federal 
Court for lack of adequate control of Edesur. Meanwhile improvised public manifestations 
continue to be held in the streets of the affected quarters. Fires are lighted in the street and 
people claim that Edesur resolve the problem. The thermometer indicated +35
oC in Buenos 
Aires that day and still 55.000 customers were without, water, air conditioning and 
ventilators. 
Friday, February 19 
Passed midnight the remaining four cables are set up for reconnection (see Appendix VIII). At 
2.30 a.m. connection is executed at 200kV, but after eight minutes a third failure is produced. 
In the morning, the construction of a by pass connection is then started (see Appendix X and 
XI), while electric generators are connected to the network. Edesur informs through press 
releases on the new strategy to solve the problem and announces the new date for total 
restoration of electric supply to Wednesday 24
th. Meanwhile, the ENRE dictates the 291/99 
resolution (ENRE, 1999), intimating Edesur to re-establish service within 24 hours. The  
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National Government creates an Energy Crisis Committee and holds its first meeting. The 
Federal Police corps and Gendarmery entail a raid at ENRE offices, at Edesur headquarters 
and at the Substation Azopardo Nueva, confiscating documents related to the crisis 
management. This is accomplished by federal court order due to the denouncement for 
incorrect management made the day before. In the afternoon, yet another intent to reconnect is 
made at Azopardo Nueva, but a new failure is produced at 100kV. 
Saturday, February 20
    
The work to accomplish the by pass is continued. Further generators are connected to the 
system, which reduce the number of affected customers. 10.000 of these, however, are still 
without electricity (see Appendix IX). The principal directors of Edesur appear in different 
mass media during the weekend.  
Sunday, February 21
 
The by pass solution entails work with tending cables. Edesur asks its customers through a 
press release to moderate electric consume to facilitate normalisation of service. The ENRE 
elaborates the Resolution 292/99 (ENRE, 1999), by which Edesur is fined to pay all affected 
customers for the period of lack of electricity.  
Monday, February 22
  
Edesur accomplishes treatment of oil for cables to be connected. The company gives their first 
press conference to which a huge number of journalists assist. A federal judge accuses Edesur 
for not collaborate with the investigation and that the ENRE is covering the company. 
Meanwhile the ENRE dictates Resolution 293/99 (ENRE, 1999), in which is determined the 
situation to justify an execution of guarantees in the concession contract. 
Tuesday, February 23  
The number of affected customers is still around 10.000. The Edesur President, Jaime 
Manzano, does not attend to a meeting in the Congress to which he had been called. At noon 
tests are made on the oil in the cables. The Edesur shares at the argentine stock exchange are 
suspended. The date for total reconnection is postponed again, but at 23.00 p.m. a connection 
is accomplished successfully which re-establishes electric supply to substation Azopardo 
Original. The evidence from the burnt out substation is handed over to Gendarmery and the 
Federal Judge.   
Wednesday, February 24  
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With 2.000 customers still without electricity (see Appendix IX), the first by pass from the 
substation Puerto Nuevo
27 to substation Azopardo Original is prepared in the morning (see 
Appendix X). In Chile the President of Enersis –the main shareholder in Edesur– declares that 
Edesur will appeal the ENRE Resolution 292/99 (ENRE, 1999). At 11:52 a.m. cable 135 is 
tested successfully at 200kV during 15 minutes. This prompts its energising around 16:20 
p.m. and is finally charged at 23.30 p.m. with approximately 30MVA. The emergency is 
technically solved, according to Edesur declarations.  
Thursday, February 25 
While the reconnection is total and the emergency declared to be over, there are still buildings 
in dark, due to local problems. Edesur notifies ENRE that the company is prepared to initiate 
the process of fines and indemnities to affected customers.  
Friday, February 26 
A public notification, a so called 'solicitada', is published by Edesur in which the company 
states it will pay only the fines that the concession contract establishes but not the 
extraordinary fines applied by the ENRE.  
Monday, March 1 
A Special Unit for all matters related to the Edesur/Azopardo Nueva crisis, is organised at the 
ENRE 
Tuesday, March 2 
The Edesur President Manzano renounces to his post and returns to Chile, being replaced by 
the Chilean engineer Marcelo Silva. 
Wednesday, March 3 
Cable 136 at Azopardo Nueva is connected through a second by pass, thereby securing double 
charge of high tension to the substations.  
Monday, March 8 
Edesur makes an appeal on the ENRE Resolution 292/99.  
Tuesday, March 9 
Edesur offers a Voluntary Indemnification Plan, by which all affected clients that had suffered 
the power outage for more than 10 hours, would be indemnified at the Edesur offices. The 
condition is that the affected client hereby renounces to any other indemnification. This 
condition is harshly criticised by the ENRE, the National Ombudsman and the Consumers 
Defence Organisations. Negotiations upon commercial and industrial indemnification for the 
                                                           




economic losses during the power outage are held between Edesur and representatives for 
affected shopkeepers and industrials.  
Thursday, March 11 
Edesur backs on the clause of renouncement in the Voluntary Indemnification Plan the 
company offers. All affected clients now have the possibility to be indemnified directly from 
Edesur, but also through the ENRE 292/99 resolution on fines and indemnfication.  
Monday, March 15 
Edesur starts paying affected clients according to the Voluntary Indemnity Plan. 
Wednesday, March 17 
In light of the lack of agreements between Edesur and the affected shopkeepers, the National 
Ombudsman is accepted as a mediator.   
Tuesday, March 30
 – Wednesday, March 31 
A Public Audience is held at the ENRE headquarters to which representatives from Edesur, 
the SEM, the GCBA and several Consumers Defence Organisations assist. The new Edesur 
General Manager, Silva, insists in this reunion that the ENRE 292/99 resolution does not have 
legal sustain.  
Wednesday, April 7 
ENRE rejects through Resolution 471/99 the appeal made on March 8 by Edesur on the 
292/99 resolution.   
Wednesday, April 20 
Edesur notifies the ENRE that the company renounces to the appeals made on March 8 and 
that the company accepts to pay all fines.  
 
 
6.  Decision-making Occasions  
 
      Decision Occasions             Decision Unit    Decision Level 
 
6.1 Cable failure and fire alarm         Small Group    Operational 
6.2 Lights are out             Small Groups    Strategic/Operational  
6.3 Reconnection failure I           Small Groups    Operational/Strategic  
6.4 Promises not kept             Small Groups    Strategic 
6.5 Reconnection failures II and III         Small Groups 
 Operational/Strategic    
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6.6 Social Protests and Political Claims    Small Group                        Strategic 
      Increase           
6.7 Edesur rejects the ENRE fines             Small Group    Strategic 
6.8 More to lose than to win                        Small Group    Strategic 
 
 
6.1 Cable Failure and Fire Alarm 
The initial cable failure at the Azopardo Nueva substation was produced during a test of 
energising in the middle of the night between Sunday, February 14 and Monday, February 15. 
The recently built substation, being one of the most important investments made by Edesur, 
was to supply the original Azopardo substation and three other substations; Pozos, Once and 
Independencia. On Sunday afternoon the connection between the oil cables 135 and 453 was 
prepared and finished. At 7:40 p.m. that same day the energising process began. This process 
was going smoothly and by routine, charging Independencia substation at Monday 2:57 a.m. 
and Pozos substation at 3:01 a.m., when 13 minutes later one of the pair of threes of cables 
between these two main cables produced a shortcut, due to failure of material and insufficient 
security measures (LAT-IITREE, 21 February 1999). This shortcut provoked a fire that, in 
turn, set fire to all other cables in the substation tunnel, including cable 136 that sustains the 
main 135 cable. Thus, a complete interruption of electric supply for the area was a fact and a 
simple contingency [one cable failure] was transformed into a double one, due to the fire.  
     At the moment of energising the connection in the Azopardo substation, only a private 
security night guard was present in the substation. When the connection failed the night guard 
had no instructions on what to do. This generated a delay in attending to the fire (ENRE 
Expert Group, May 1999). Also the lack of extinguishing equipment in the tunnel hindered 
Edesur technicians from extinguishing the fire, once they did arrive to the site. The fire 
brigade finally arrived and entered the tunnel with their water extinguishers at 3:47 a.m. The 
use of water in extinguishing a fire of oil cables is inadequate as it humidifies the cables for 
subsequent use (Ibid.). The emergency, however, had prompted this quick decision which was 
made by the fire brigade and the Edesur technicians in the site. 
 
6.2      Lights are out 
Once extinguished the fire, the consequences stood clear: a quick estimation counted to more 
than 150.000 affected customers or 600.000 Porteños (Buenos Aires inhabitants) in dark. The 
technicians informed the Board of Directors as they realised the complexity of the situation.  
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The technicians figured there were three options to choose between in order to re-connect. 
Those were: 
1)  To repair the burnt out cables, making new connections and entail a new energising 
process in the same substation.   
2)  To entail a so-called ‘by pass’, connecting the substation Azopardo Original with the 
substations Pozos, Once and Independencia, thus, excluding the new Azopardo Nueva 
substation (see Appendix X and XI). 
3)  To entail transitory connections between cables of distinct technology (dry and oil 
cables).  
The options available signified different lapses of time in order to be accomplished and this 
was what determined the decision. The technicians suggested the third alternative was risky, 
since this technology was not very known in Argentina, the Edesur board of directors opted, 
in line with the technicians, for the quickest solution, which was option number one. This was 
estimated to require 60 hours of work, while the by pass option would have demanded some 
120 hours. The work to repair the burnt out cable tunnel began that same morning (Hechos, 
March/April 1999, p.9). Meanwhile, it was decided also to connect to existing medium 
tension networks and to install provisory medium tension cables in order to reduce the 
number of affected clients (Ibid.p.11).  
 
This same morning, Edesur Communication Manager, Daniel Martini, was woke up early by 
a call on his mobile, being on vacations with his family in the south of Argentina. He was 
informed on the power outage in Capital Federal and on the evolution of the situation. 
Together with the General Manager, Jaime Manzano, and the Press Manager, Ignacio 
Siscardi, they decided on an immediate communication strategy. Siscardi would contact 
media and inform on the situation. Siscardi, thus, declared in radio and TV that the situation 
would be normalised within that same day. This information was provided, however, without 
having a clear diagnostic of how long the repair would actually take. Not until afternoon the 
technicians would establish 48 hours as a reasonable term to re-establish service. A second 
call to the media, thus, informed on the new terms. Martini, meanwhile, packed his luggage 
and returned to Buenos Aires.  
 
Edesur defined the contingency to be of technical character and that a solution soon would be 
at hand. As the Monday passed by, the Edesur people felt at ease – a solution has been 




Also the supervising state organisation, ENRE, appreciated the situation to be one of technical 
nature. They were informed by fax from Edesur at 9:00 a.m. on the incident and maintained a 
close communication with the company throughout the day, following the evolution of the 
situation. The acting of the ENRE was one of 'wait and see'. This non-decision was not an ad 
hoc standpoint, but part of the ENRE sanction procedure. The ENRE normally take account 
of the irregularity when it happens and then sanctions twice a year,
28 and thus this incident 
would be sanctioned later on as all the others.  
 
At the Government of the City of Buenos Aires (GCBA) there was not yet any perception of 
an emergency, as the idea of this incident as one of a short term reigned also here. The lack of 
electricity produced a lot of disturbances to the inhabitants and to the people working in the 
affected areas of Capital Federal, besides the lack of lights, of energy, of refrigeration, of 
sewage and of elevators. The banks' entire operative systems were out of function, as well as 
the streetlights and one of the underground lines. Entire workplaces, such as an annex to the 
National Congress, had to be shut down due to the lack of electricity. Federal Police 
redistributed street and helicopter patrols on duty to the affected area and for vigilance in 
order to avoid a potential wave of crimes due to the dark. Traffic Police located officers 
dressed in phosphorescent vests in the street to direct the traffic where streetlights were out of 
function (Clarín, 16 February, 1999). Together with Edesur the GCBA through its Civil 
Defence installed provisory mobile electricity generators in strategic places, such as hospitals 
that lacked emergency equipment, in order to respond to the immediate necessities. The 
measures taken however were prompted by specific needs according to the specific situation 
as nobody imagined, at this point, that the situation would last.    
  
6.3   Reconnection failure I 
On Tuesday evening the repairs in the Azopardo Nueva substation were being concluded. The 
cables had been reconnected with new material and on Wednesday morning, Edesur 
technicians started executing the connections. The operation of charging connections was 
entailed from the Once substation, beginning at 12:30 p.m. Cable 453 was being charged with 
200 kV, when the technicians after 15 minutes detected a discharge on this cable. A new 
failure was a fact.  
                                                           




          The failure was unthinkable to Edesur. The technicians were confused and asking 
themselves how such a commonly performed operation could possibly fail. The immediate 
evaluation was that the connection must have had a problem with the material. It was 
therefore decided to intent a second reconnection in the same substation, but now on cable 
454 using cable material from another stock (LAT-IITREE, 21 February 1999:15). The work 
to reconnect started immediately. While the number of affected customers had by then been 
reduced to 55.000, or 220.000 persons, those who were still in dark were really losing 
patience. 
 
6.4  Promises not kept 
Edesur had not been able to fulfil with the promise of terms and had now to face public 
opinion and the ENRE. The Thursday was the fourth day in dark and the warm summer 
weather was becoming a nightmare for the remaining 55.000 affected customers. Already on 
the day before, manifestations had been held in the street where people were protesting 
loudly. The new repair of cables in the Azopardo Nueva substation prompted the Edesur 
Communication Department to inform media that but another 24 hours would be required to 
recover electric supply. The social and political pressure on Edesur was increasing. Mass 
media was covering the case meticulously and the situation was by now a crisis in all senses 
to the company. The Communication Department decided to call for external help and hired 
the services of a private information consultant, Nueva Comunicación [New Communication] 
(Dillenberger & Curubeto, 1999:12; Interview with Daniel Martini, Edesur). That evening the 
General Manager Manzano had a meeting with newspapers and a couple of hours later he 
participated in an important TV show with high rating, while the Communication Manager 
participated in the Telenoche [Telenight] eight o’clock news. Also a radio message was 
repeated in which Edesur informed on the terms for restoration of electricity.  
 
The failure on part of Edesur to fulfil the terms announced also prompted a decision from the 
control organisation ENRE. Up until then the ENRE stance had been to await and sanction by 
the end of evaluation period. At this point, though, it stood clear to ENRE that this was not an 
ordinary irregularity. On Wednesday evening the ENRE dictated Resolution number 222/99 
(ENRE, 1999), which determined that  
1)  The case was not one of force majeur, meaning Edesur was responsible 
2)  Edesur must indemnify the affected customers on next electricity bill 
3)  The terms for paying next bill of Edesur must be delayed    
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The decision of the ENRE was legally based on the determinations of the contract of 
concession, in a case of unfulfillment of service.  
 
Also for the Buenos Aires Government (GCBA) the Edesur failure to keep its promise and the 
fact that the social situation worsened, prompted a decision to organise an emergency 
operation for the affected inhabitants. The Emergency Committee at the Civil Defence of the 
GCBA was co-ordinating any necessary measures and was by Wednesday, February 17, 
defining the situation as becoming one of emergency: buildings without drinking water, 
sewage, refrigerators, elevators, lights, air conditioning; food in decomposition, toilets out of 
function. There were mobile electric generators circulating, provided by different companies 
such as Edesur, Edenor and Edelap, by provincial institutions such as those of the 
Government of the Buenos Aires Province and by EPEC, the Electric Company in the city of 
Córdoba; by federal institutions such as the Argentinean Army and the Argentinean Navy. 
These were located at different buildings by the Civil Defence and some of them rotated 
between different buildings in order to pump up water to the tanks on the roof. The GCBA 
Emergency Committee preparedness included evacuations if it would become necessary.  
 
6.5  Reconnection failures II and III 
In the evening on Thursday, February 18, a reconnection was accomplished in one of the 
connections and it was successfully charged with 200kV during 15 minutes. The remaining 
connections were made and finished after midnight. At 2:30 a.m., on Friday 19, the 454 cable 
was charged completely with 200kV. After eight minutes another discharge was produced in 
substation Pozos – another failure! 
     The unthinkable had happened again and the Edesur technicians as the rest of the company 
could not believe it. The company board of directors pressed its technicians hard for a 
solution. The hypothesis of a failure in material, provenient from the Pirelli Company, 
prompted the decision to make a third intent but now with other material. The repeated 
failures, however, made company executives to reconsider whether this would really be the 
best solution. The political and social pressure on Edesur was increasing every hour and it 
was hard to sustain the justifications for the continued blackout. There were still 55.000 
customers in dark, being the fifth day now. In light of the insufficient solutions, the technical 
alternative of a ‘by pass’ was taken into reconsideration. While this option had been 
disqualified earlier due to the terms for execution, this was by now a less important matter. 
The goal was now to accomplish a solution no matter what time it could take. The ‘by pass’  
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implied connecting cables 135 and 136 directly from Electric Central Puerto Nuevo to 
substations Pozos, Once and Independencia, leaving out substation Azopardo completely. 
Edesur executives discussed the alternative with the technicians and considered two 
alternatives where to make the connection, that was, a location above ground. The options 
were the Venezuela Street or the plaza between Belgrano Avenue and Paseo Colon. The risk 
for fourth failure prompted Edesur to opt for starting the by pass connection, in case. 
Excavations in Venezuela Street as well as in the plaza began that same morning. After a 
couple of hours, however, it was decided to concentrate all work in the plaza, why the 
Venezuela Street was cleaned up and left. At noon a third and final trial of reconnection in the 
damaged cables was ready to be accomplished, now with other material provided by Edesur. 
At 3:00 p.m. the cable was charged but the failure was detected already at 100 kV. Work was 
then completely dedicated to the by pass solution, knowing this was to take at least four days.        
 
The second reconnection failure on Friday morning was not just a technical failure. The 
negative impact on the company’s image was transforming the crisis into a communicational 
catastrophe. Up until then Edesur had made eight public declarations, press releases and 
interviews in media, in which restoration of electric supply was promised within short terms; 
within the next hours, tonight, tomorrow morning, within the next 24 hours and so on (Clarín, 
February 16-19, 1999). Although the number of affected customers had been reduced since 
the first day, by installing generators and connecting to medium tension networks, the 
remaining 55.000 were by now furious. Street manifestations were held day and night and the 
situation was attracting more and more political attention, on local as well as national level. 
Thus, on Friday after the second failure, the company decided to make no declarations at all. 
Silence thus reigned on part of the company, which only fuelled the fury of the people.  
 
On part of the ENRE, the organisation was closely following the management of Edesur in 
this crisis – such was its role. Five days after the blackout, on Friday, February 19, also the 
ENRE was being criticised for its management of the whole situation, or rather for its lack of 
action. A charge had actually been made at a federal court against the agency on Thursday, 
February 18. This charged ENRE with not accomplishing of its mission in the Edesur case for 
which a police raid at the ENRE headquarters was accomplished on Friday by order of a 
Federal Judge, with the purpose to confiscate documents that could reveal any irregularity in 
the ENRE procedures regarding this issue. The ENRE executives were politically pressed 
from the Secretariat of Energy and Mining as political and social claims increased. Thus,  
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when the second reconnection failure was a fact the ENRE responded with a new Resolution, 
291/99 (ENRE, 1999), in which it intimated Edesur to re-establish service within 24 hours 
and if not the company would be fined.  
 
The repeated failures in re-establish electricity prompted the Buenos Aires Government 
(GCBA) and its Civil Defence to put the emergency plan in action. This included the 
distribution in affected areas of mineral water, ice cubes, candles and food, the installing of 
water taps, the installing of mobile generators in order to make the water pumps work and by 
this fill tanks on the roof and put sewage system in function. The Emergency Operations 
Centre at the DC was the operative nucleus, co-ordinating its proper staff, the Buenos Aires 
Fire Brigades and the Buenos Aires Police Force as well as federal resources such as the 
Superintendence of Fire Brigades, the Cascos Blancos,
29 the Army Forces, the Gendarmery, 
the National Secretary of Social Development, the National Secretary of Internal Security, 
and PAMI.
30 The DC headquarters also functioned as the decision making centre, where the 
GCBA Chief of Government, Fernando De la Rúa, together with the GCBA Chiefs of 
Secretaries, met with the operative units at the Civil Defence to discuss the situation and make 
decisions on what do next. Also the GCBA, due to the delay in solving the problem, had to 
take measures regarding food store. The high temperatures and the lack of refrigeration were a 
potential health problem. This risk was considered in the emergency plan by the end of the 
first week and the GCBA decided to let the Sub-secretariat of Alimentary Security to start 
confiscating aliments from restaurants, butchers, fisheries and other food stores. The GCBA 
Secretariat of Social Promotion was also decided to assist persons with special needs, 
particularly elders. Social assistants were sent out to help these to get down and up the stairs 
of the buildings in order to get up, to help them with personal hygiene, to buy food for them 
and to accompany them. In a country where the social security system is precarious and does 
certainly not include communal assistance in the elders’ home, this was very much an 
emergency measure. Also other political decisions were made by the GCBA such as 
postponing the expiration for latest payment of income tax for affected inhabitants. The 
situation also prompted the Legislative Power in the City of Buenos Aires decided to discount 
20% of the city taxes for street cleaning and lightning for the affected inhabitants.         
 
                                                           
29 The White Helmets (Cascos Blancos) is the Argentinean international peace force sorting under the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
30 PAMI (Programa de Asistencia Médica Integral) is the national social service program for pensioners, created in 1971 at 
the National Institute of Social Service for Pensioners.    
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6.6  Social Protests and Political Claims Increase 
The weekend February 20-21 was of no rest for the involved actors in the blackout crisis. 
Edesur had accomplished to re-establish supply for some 20.000 customers, but there were 
still about 30.000 customers suffering more than six days of summer heat without water or 
light. Street manifestations increased and public declarations were by now made by any 
public representative; executive politicians from local and national governments, opposition 
politicians, legislators and representatives of different NGOs, such as Consumers Defence and 
the Commercial Camera. The national government formed an Energy Crisis Committee 
constituted by Ministers, Secretaries of State and Directors of Regulating Agencies, whose 
fundamental objective was declared to be re-establish electricity and palliate the crisis with 
emergency social assistance (Clarín, 20 February, 1999d).    
     Edesur was harshly criticised in all media and voices claiming for the annulment of the 
concession contract were being heard. While Edesur chose not to make any public 
declarations to this claim, the ENRE did feel obliged to react. In name of the 'protection of the 
customer' and in light of the criticism that also this organisation was exposed to, all ENRE 
employees spent the weekend working in the headquarters, presumably a quite stressful 
context. The Board of Directors in the first hand took notice that the intimation made on 
Edesur on Friday had not been accomplished. This lack of accomplishment prompted the 
Resolution 292/99 (ENRE, 1999), which stated that Edesur should pay additional fines to all 
affected customers in accordance with the time these have been without electric supply. This 
would reach sums around US$ 60 millions (Clarín, 22 February, 1999) 
     After the Friday silence, Edesur communication department, with a technical solution at 
hand, now felt confident to apply a new communication strategy. After the first reconnection 
failure, on Thursday, February 18, the decision making now involved Enersis management 
and approval from Chile. The pressure on Edesur from its own shareholders was important. 
The accusations of impotence and lack of management capacity of the company, made Edesur 
feel this was becoming an issue of image. With the help from the communication consultant 
Nueva Comunicación, it was decided to give information flow a purely technical character. 
The 'public face' and information unit included now the Transmission Director Fernando 
Manzione and the Commercial Director Juan Camilo Olavarría. On Saturday, February 20, 
this unit visited the most important newspapers Clarín, La Nación and Ambito Financiero at 
their headquarters, giving large interviews to the editors. On Monday, February 22, a press 
conference was arranged at an important hotel in the centre of the city, in which the core of 




6.7  Edesur rejects the ENRE fines 
In the evening on Wednesday, February 24, the by pass of oil cable 135 had been successfully 
energised and eventually electric supply was re-established in the affected area, as Edesur 
through Information Manager Martini declared at 8:37 p.m. The nightmare seemed to be 
coming to an end for Edesur, although the extraordinary fines applied by the ENRE had 
reached by then some US$ 100 millions and the Edesur shares on the Argentine stock market 
had been momentarily suspended due to the crisis. That was when the principal shareholder in 
Edesur, the Chilean company Enersis, declared the invalidity of the fines of ENRE resolution 
292/99. The Enersis president José Antonio Guzmán declared in a radio of Santiago de Chile 
on Wednesday morning that the fines had no judicial sustain nor were they considered in the 
contract, why Enersis would appeal to court in order to avoid paying. These declarations were 
received as a mere provocation in Buenos Aires and prompted several responses.  
          The ENRE reacted to the Chilean declarations by soliciting support from the Secretariat 
of Energy and Mining (SEM) to the 292/99 resolution. In spite of some objections within this 
Secretariat regarding the legal framework of the resolution, the General Secretary César 
McKarthy gave his full approval (E-mail communication with ENRE Vice-president Devoto, 
16 January, 2001). He also accomplished the National Crisis Committee to decide on the 
elaboration of a decree of necessity and emergency in order to put pressure on Edesur to pay 
the extraordinary fines. The decree was prepared and put at disposition if the company would 
insist on not paying. On the other hand, the ENRE responded to public and political opinion –
which after the Chilean declarations manifested an even mayor support for abolishing the 
contract with Edesur– by declaring a Public Audience on March 30, in which representatives 
for all affected social and political actors would have the opportunity to make declarations.  
     The Edesur board of directors realised the offensiveness in the Enersis declarations and 
that public opinion was still extremely sensitive. So did the only Argentinean shareholder in 
Edesur, Perez Companc. Both companies, thus, made public declarations that Edesur would 
pay the fines, no matter what. These declarations against Edesur’s main stockholder were to 
have severe internal consequences, however. On Thursday, February 25, the Enersis president 
Guzman arrived on Buenos Aires and Edesur immediately started deliberating what strategy 
would be convenient to avoid the extraordinary fines. On March 2 the Edesur board of 
directors accepted the resignation presented by the General Manager Jaime Manzano and one 





6.8   To Pay or Not to Pay 
In spite of the re-established electric supply, then, the social and political harsh climate 
endured, extending the crisis for another month and a half and turning it into a judicial, 
political and economic issue. In the meantime the Argentine political opinion left the position 
of annulling the contract with Edesur, but maintained the principle of ‘who is responsible will 
pay’. The amount of denounces in the ENRE headquarters made by household customers, in 
order to be indemnified for ‘suffering and damages’ grew day by day, which produced the 
creation of a new department within the ENRE; the ‘Unit Edesur/Azopardo’, to attend only 
the matters related with this crisis. The risk that Edesur would make an appeal on the legal 
sustain of the ENRE resolution 292/99 was eminent and was reinforced by local jurists who 
declared on their doubts about this resolution. That could mean serious complications for the 
Argentinean State, since someone would have to take charge for the economic and social 
losses of the blackout, and the state was in the end the responsible for the concession of 
electric supply. This potential economic threat and loss of political credibility gathered the 
whole Argentinean political establishment on the firm stance that Edesur should pay. This 
was a firm decision all the way from the President Menem and the entire national government 
on the top, to the ENRE and the National Congress, and down to local Buenos Aires 
Government. The ENRE declared in press that Edesur should pay first and in case the 
company did not agree to the resolution, appeal afterwards, according the Administrative 
Procedures legislation. On the Edesur claims to ENRE for reconsideration on the very same 
resolution 292/99, the ENRE decided to not consider it.   
          Edesur on their part had also made the status quo something of a heart matter. The 
company had already on Tuesday, February 25, notified the ENRE they were willing to 
initiate the process of indemnifying affected customers, but those were but the fines 
considered in the contract of concession. To give in and accept the extraordinary fines would 
be something of a defeat and also set jurisprudence for future conflicts of this kind. It was 
therefore important to set an example, not just to the Argentinean State but also to other states 
where these globalised shareholders could act. This stance was turned on its head, however, 
when the stockholdings in the Chilean Enersis were sold to the Spanish Endesa by the end of 
March 1999. This prompted a new stance regarding the Edesur conflict in Argentina, as the 
policy of Endesa was completely different to that of Enersis’ management. On April 20, 
Edesur notified the ENRE the total acceptance of the 292/99 resolution and the abstinence  
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from bringing the case to a higher judicial instance. By this decision, the crisis had come to an 
end.   
 
 
7.   Thematic Analysis  
7.1  Problem Framing & Decision Units 
Crisis research indicates that the initial image that is constructed of the situation after the first 
impetus has important effects on the subsequent crisis management (Sundelius, 1998:8). This 
is what is called the framing of the problem. This is not as easy as it could appear at first 
sight, but a rather complex process of making sense of a situation. There are several 
dimensions on this process to take account of here, in order to understand its importance for 
the crisis management as a whole.  
          On the one hand, it is a matter of subjective representation. In accordance with the 
cognitive institutional approach we are applying, the initial problem framing is a result of 
subjective interpretation of an event within a particular social context. For the discussion here 
this means a particular social actor will interpret a situation as a problem of a specific nature, 
according to the institutional context in which the actor acts and to the subjective life 
experience s/he carries. Also, not to forget, the different interests at stake in any contingency 
will determine the representation of the problem and the very crisis management. As 
Newlove, Stern & Svedin point out, this heterogeneity in problem framing among different 
crisis management actors involved, is bound to prioritise different aspects of the crisis, often 
at the cost of other aspects (2000:114). Such was for example the case in the ‘Doñana crisis’ 
in Spain in 1998, where the environmental damages from the mine dam outlet were given far 
more priorities than the agricultural problems, something the local farmers protested against 
long after the actual crisis was over (Ullberg, 2001).   
     The problem framing can also be a matter of getting adequate information in order to get a 
clear picture of the problem and creating coherent options for decision making, of which the 
Chernobyl accident is an appropriate example. In this case the available information framed 
the problem as a local spill of nuclear radiation from the Swedish nuclear station where the 
radiation was detected, which had implications for the immediate decisions made (Stern, 
1999:213).  
     Finally the problem framing is also a question of processes that can transform over time. 
Such was the case in the Auckland power outage (Newlove, Stern & Svedin 2000:114-117) 




The Buenos Aires blackout shows parallels in the process of problem framing with this latter 
case. The initial interpretation of the power shortage as a consequence of the fire in the 
substation had two essential aspects. One was that this was a technical matter to be solved by 
the Edesur technical staff. The second was that it was a short-term problem. This was a 
common interpretation for all involved institutional actors. Surely the amount of affected 
customers worried, as did the infrastructural disturbances provoked by the lack of electricity; 
no subway, no elevators, no traffic lights, no street lights, no air conditioning, no computers 
and so on. This initial framing of the situation also prompted the constitution of particular 
decision units and the immediate decisions made by these.  
          The technicians at Edesur constituted the principal operative decision unit when they 
responded to the outage. Their framing of the problem -technical and short-term- was a kind 
of an expert's diagnostic that set the framing for the other involved actors. The Edesur 
executives, when informed, acceded to this problem framing and approved of the technical 
procedure, which was setting up for a new reconnection in the very same cable. Meanwhile 
public was informed that the cables were being repaired which would only be a matter of 
hours before things were back to normal, all on basis of the technicians' problem framing.  
     The ENRE took routinely notice of the power outage in order to charge Edesur for the lack 
of service as determined in the contract. The ENRE works in a system of ex post facto 
(Interview with ENRE Vice-president Devoto). This means that the regulation agency takes 
account of any irregularity in the performance of the companies in the electric sector once 
they occur, and charges the company within a six months period, normally through fines 
(Ibid.). This technical and short-term problem appeared at first sight, thus, to be but yet 
another irregularity in the daily performance of Edesur, indicating the frequency of power 
outages in the city of Buenos Aires and suburbs. One of the political arguments for the 
privatisation of SEGBA was actually the frequency in blackouts when this State Company 
provided electricity in Buenos Aires. Through privatisation the outages would be eradicated, 
service in general would be infinitely better and controlled by the state, which is the very 
raison d’être of the ENRE.  
     The Government of the City of Buenos Aires, as the National Government together with 
the Congress and the Senate suffered the blackout in some of their institutional buildings, 
which made work more difficult, but the underlying assumption was that this would soon be 
taken care of. At the GCBA Civil Defence the situation was also taken calmly. This operative 
rescue institution, in fact, had not even a power outage included as a potential catastrophe  
Página 46 
 
situation to attend to (Interview with Oscar Sanchez, Civil Defence, GCBA). Less, then, 
would a notion of emergency be produced within this institution after a day of blackout or 
two. Nobody, thus, ever imagined this situation would endure. Less did anyone ask, 'What do 
we do if the blackout continues?' As in the Auckland power failure (Newlove, Stern & 
Svedin, 2000:114-117), the short-term perspective and hand over to technical staff in the very 
problem framing, thus, produced severe delays in the decision making process and the 
response to the contingency.    
     As the power outage continued through the days and no real solution was presented, there 
was a shift in problem framing and decision units subsequently changed. As is pointed out 
above, the problem framing is a matter of subjectivity and can differ between involved actors, 
as can the shifts in this determination. During the first days the attention in Edesur had been 
focused on coming up with the right technical solution in order to restore electric supply. 
When a solution was finally presented through the by pass alternative, to begin with, the 
temporal perspective changed. What had been framed as a short-term problem with an 
immediate solution at hand, was now accepted as a medium-term crisis. Harsh criticism was, 
however, being raised against the company for not solving the problem and for what was 
perceived as inaccurate information. For Edesur the issue at stake now became the public 
image and the maintenance of confidence. This re-framing made Edesur employ essentially 
new communication strategies (see chapter 7.4). In spite of the solution at hand tensions did 
not decrease, however. In social and political terms there was rather an escalation of crisis 
produced, due to shifts in problem framing. While Edesur was by the end of the first week 
confident on a solution –and visualising an end to the crisis– the public opinion turned into 
fury and the situation was being framed as one of negligence and lack of will on part of the 
company to accomplish a solution. This situation prompted a shift in the decision making 
process, from the operative scene to the strategic one, from the technicians to the executive 
level. The communication department took front, as one of the critical issues was that of 
public (mis)information. Within this process of shifting decision level, another shift on part of 
this corporate actor was produced, which was that of moving power of decision from Edesur 
executives to its shareholders, indicating an up-scaling of the crisis.     
     Within the ENRE a re-framing of the contingency began after some days. The resolutions 
222/99 and 292/99 (ENRE, 1999) were both intended to indemnify the affected clients and the 
ENRE early realised that someone –the corporation or the state– would have to attend to this 
issue. This clearly indicates a re-framing of the problem as one of economic and judicial 
responsibility. This re-framing affected decision units and decision levels. While ENRE was  
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still the formal unit through which any sanction of Edesur would pass, their decisions would 
somehow be considered by the National Government. This had not actively participated in the 
crisis management until Friday, February 19, when a National Crisis Committee was set up to 
handle the problem. The Secretary of Energy and Mining at the Finance Ministry was the 
nexus between ENRE and the Government, but also their involvement increased as the crisis 
was up-scaled. This up scaling to a national level, thus, has to do with the shift from a short-
term problem to a long-term, on the one hand, and with the increasing importance of the 
political and economic dimensions, on the other hand. The escalation in decision making 
levels and political response was thus a product of a shift in perspective, from being a local 
infra-structural contingency and social disturbance, into a national legal and political issue.  
     In similarity with the Auckland power outage the final shift in framing turned economy 
into a central issue. The economic losses, the indemnities, the ENRE fines and the initial 
denial of Edesur to pay took central stage in final stage of the crisis. This framing of the 
problem was, however, penetrated by political standpoints, avowing for the annulment of the 
Edesur concession and very much an ideological stance against privatisation politics and 
foreign ownership.  
 
In order to understand the notion of problem framing I would like to see it as much as a 
process as the very crisis development. Without creating a unilinear chain of sequences, the 
concept of process permits us to observe the shifts in time and space when it comes to an 
actor’s defining of a particular problem. While the initial framing is of outmost importance, 
being the first instance where the problem is defined and being the one that sets out for the 
rest to come, the subsequent framings are not less important. Vertzberger observes that the 
initial problem framing acquires the character of an objective truth, while it is really a matter 
of subjective appreciation (1990:233). The very definition of a crisis as a chain of decision-
making problems to respond to indicates the probability of new framings of the problem to 
come up underway. The processual perspective sheds light on the interrelationships between a 
particular problem framing, its response and new framings as a consequence to these. Finally, 
problem framing as a process also shows that in spite of the differences in how different 
actors frame 'one and the same problem' –a blackout in this case– these subjective 
representations of the problem interact with those of the others. Defining the problem is a 
complex setting of cognitive features that set the stage for the decisions to be made, which 




7.2  Institutional Co-operation and Conflict    
A crisis generally entails several different actors in its management, be it various 
governments, different organisations within a state administration, political parties, corporate 
actors or civil society. This requires the different actors to interact in some way, which can be 
either productive to or constraining for the decision-making process (Allison, 1971; Stern & 
Bynander 1998:326-327). The cultural features of a particular national administration may 
advocate consensus on the decisions to be made (Sundelius, Stern & Bynander, 1997:150-
151; Newlove, Stern & Svedin, 2000:122), like in Sweden,
31 while in other countries, like in 
Spain (Ullberg, 2001), consensus is not a decision-making strategy that is particularly strived 
for. Bearing these cultural differences in mind, there are findings that show how a crisis is not 
just a contingency, but also an opportunity, both individually and organisationally (Stern & 
Bynander 1998:327; Rosenthal, t’Hart & Kouzmin 1991; ‘t Hart 1993:40).  
          The Buenos Aires blackout shed light on several dimensions of intra- and inter-
organisational co-operation as well as conflict. Edesur does present an image of consensus 
regarding decision-making within the company in which all departments supported the 
actions taken (Hechos, March/April 1999; Interview with Daniel Martini, Edesur). There were 
instances during the crisis, however, when this smooth co-operation encountered obstacles. 
Within the first days of the blackout the entire company was working on ‘the Azopardo 
matter’, from the technical and service departments to the financial, legal and executive ones. 
However, the decisions that would lead to a solution and to an end of the crisis, were decided 
at the operational level, by the technicians, to be approved by the Edesur management and 
informed to public through the communication departments. Thus, the company was during 
the first phase of the crisis entirely dependent on its technicians. The executive board suffered 
the pressure from the shareholders, but the communication department was the section that 
found itself pressed. The communication department had to inform on the trials and errors of 
the technical departments, not once but constantly, sometimes several times a day, as mass 
media and affected clients required information. When the technical prognostics were not 
fulfilled, the communication department had to face the public and 'regret' the lack of 
solutions. Although this of course was their very task, there is no doubt that this generated 
stress on the communication department. 
     The second instance where there was an intra-organisational conflict within this corporate 
organisation was when the Chilean shareholder Enersis’ president Guzman declared that 
                                                           
31 See Swedish cases like the submarine U137 incident in 1981 and the monetary crisis in 1992 (Sundelius, Stern & 
Bynander, 1997)  
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Edesur by no means would pay the extraordinary fines established by the ENRE. The impact 
was enormous in Argentinean press, not to mention on the political arena and with public 
opinion, which historically have had a conflictive relation to its neighbour country Chile. 
Edesur in Buenos Aires and the national shareholder Perez Companc immediately made 
counter declarations in order to mitigate somewhat their partner’s stance. The clear division in 
standpoints between the shareholders not only disfavoured the Edesur public image but also 
harmed the decision-making process within the company. By then, the core matters in the 
crisis was becoming the economical aspects, with some US$ 100 millions in indemnities at 
stake, on the one hand, against the Edesur public image, the political confidence and the 
whole concession contract, on the other. While the Edesur president Manzano ended up 
somehow sacrificed, the differences in Chilean and Argentine perspectives were negotiated 
during a month. Meanwhile the very destiny of the Chilean Enersis was being negotiated 
elsewhere, ending up with the Spanish Endesa taking charge of Enersis and of the conflict 
with Edesur. Endesa realised the fastest road to reconciliation with Edesur, the Argentinean 
State and Buenos Aires clients was to bow heads down and pay with a smile. So was done. 
      
When it comes to the governmental performance in the Buenos Aires blackout, there were 
several institutions involved in the dealing with the crisis. The regulating ENRE (Ente 
Reguladora de Electricidad) was the main responsible for surveying the Edesur crisis 
management. The regulation bodies are supposed to be independent regulating bureaux, 
controlling the private companies providing electricity, gas, water and other infrastructure. 
This is in theory, however. When the power outage became a political issue, the political 
pressure on the ENRE hardened. A police raid was even entailed at the ENRE headquarters 
by Federal Court order, as the institution had been accused of bad management in its 
functions. The Federal Judge Servía Cubrini had decided to concede the charges from a 
lawyer and accomplish an investigation, for which she ordered raids at Edesur and ENRE 
headquarters. This legal case did not develop further since the charges were withdrawn due to 
lack of proof (E-mail communication with A. Devoto, ENRE, 18 June 2001), but the mere 
fact of a lawsuit for 'bad management' indicates institutional and in this case political 
competence. As public criticism towards the ENRE management of the crisis increased, the 
decision-making autonomy of the bureau was being reduced to politically correct resolutions. 
The Secretariat of Energy and Mining (SEM) was the governmental nexus to the ENRE, from 
where the bureau received substantial support but also demands to act harder with the private 




company Edesur. When the ENRE dictated the 292/99 resolution, which was an important 
measure with the corporation, the Secretariat was divided, however. The question on whether 
the resolution and the extraordinary fines therein applied on Edesur were legal or not was the 
dividing element. While the SEM General Secretary McKarthy supported the resolution, in 
spite of the legal doubts, there were advisers within this institution that did not adhere to this 
stance. The tensions in this institutional relationship between the ENRE and the SEM were 
manifested earlier on. Already the first week after the blackout the SEM required the ENRE 
to create the necessary conditions for an execution of the guarantees of the contract with 
Edesur. The execution of the guarantees would signify the loss of the shares in Edesur to the 
corporate shareholders, what was in media described as annulling the concession contract. 
The ENRE board was not only reluctant to receive any kind of orders, being an autonomous 
state organisation, but it also considered this instance –the most extreme of measures in the 
contract– had yet not been reached. The ENRE board, however, emitted the 291/99 resolution 
that claimed Edesur re-establish service within 24 hours and, if not accomplished, the 
execution of the guarantees could then be considered.   
       At an operative level there were no doubts that the Civil Defence (DC) of the GCBA 
(Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires) was the institution responsible for alleviating the 
situation for the affected population, which is its very raison d’être. The DC was also the co-
ordinating centre for all actions, working as an operative nexus between the Federal Police, 
the Gendarmery, Edesur and the local government (GCBA). As in the Auckland case 
(Newlove, Stern & Svedin, 2000:123), these emergency services worked very well together, 
probably due to the existing co-operative relationship in matters of contingency. The Civil 
Defence, as a centre of organisation and distribution of resources, was not exempt the political 
game, however. While Edesur donated more than a million litres of mineral water and hired 
every available generator in the city of Buenos Aires (Hechos, March/April 1999, p.11), it 
was the DC that distributed these elements in affected parts of the city. These actions, thus, 
counted for the GCBA as it appeared, while Edesur was harshly criticised in press for their 
lack of compassion with the affected population and for the lack of action (Clarín, February 
16-23, 1999). While Buenos Aires Head of Government, Fernando De la Rúa, could profit 
politically by the actions of ‘his’ Civil Defence, the President Carlos Menem and the National 
Government felt surpassed in involvement in the crisis. Menem therefore ordered the National 
Peace Force, the White Helmets (Cascos Blancos), into the streets helping out with 
evacuations and other social necessities. These actions did not really difficult the crisis 
management per se, but they evidence the institutional prestige at stake in a contingency. At  
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an operative level, then, the institutional competition was rather expressed in political terms 
and did not complicate the work. It should be borne in mind, however, that this contingency 
counted with substantial time for the DC to work, in spite of the GCBA's claims on Edesur for 
more information in order to organise the emergency response. In spite of high temperatures 
and important complications for daily life routines, no lives were lost, nor were there any 
evacuations. I would, thus, not label this case a catastrophe. Only parts of the city were 
affected, why many affected neighbours could actually visit relatives or friends in other parts 
of the city in order to wash clothes or take a shower. The majority of the city's hospitals had 
their own reserve generators and those who did not were attended with mobile generators. 
What appears to have been a smooth organisation then, with the DC in centre, would perhaps 
have to be scrutinised in circumstances of higher demand of action and time pressure, in order 
to detect the frailties and strengths in these institutional interactions.   
 
7.3  Information Processing  
As mentioned earlier, the issue of communication and information was central in the Buenos 
Aires blackout, following a discernible pattern in contemporaneous crisis management. The 
information flow is bound to increase in a crisis situation, as new and often unthinkable 
scenarios appear, while there is at the same time a lack of time to process this (Sundelius 
1998:8-9). Notions like 'information overload' and 'gate-keepers' are likely to appear in 
situations like this. The first refers to the overload of certain information on behalf of other, 
which can also be of importance (Purkitt, 1992; Sundelius et al, 1997:165). The latter are 
persons at strategic points in an organisation that control the information flow, particularly 
upwards They can serve the decision making process for good or for bad, in the sense that the 
decision-makers on the top receive filtered information on which to make their decisions 
(Sundelius 1998:8-9). This segmented information processing does also have other risks, like 
the surpassing of meso level departments within the organisation, which can affect the crisis 
management.  
     In the Buenos Aires blackout, the control of the information flow was delegated to specific 
information processing departments –ad hoc or permanent– in all involved institutions. At 
Edesur, a restructuration of the company organisation in January 1999 (only one month before 
the Azopardo incident) implied the creation of a Communication and Institutional Relations 
General Department, equating communication issues with other General Departments within 
the organisation. The sitting Edesur Press Chief, Daniel Martini, took charge for this 
department. Before 1999, communication issues were managed within a Press and  
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Information Department, sorting under the General Department. When the blackout happened 
there was thus no ad hoc response within the Edesur organisation. The different departments 
did reinforce their work input and during the first days, the executives did not get one night’s 
sleep (Interview with Daniel Martini, Edesur). The organisation remained the same however, 
which implied that information was transmitted from the technicians at the Department of 
Distribution and the Department of Services, directly to the General Management and to the 
Board, while the Communication Management received only what was to be communicated 
to the press. This segmented information flow became an important problem for Edesur, 
producing a public communication problem, as we shall see in next chapter.   
 
What regards the public actors the internal communication channels within the City of Buenos 
Aires Government (GCBA) functioned through the Civil Defence (DC). When the situation 
was started to be framed as a contingency, daily morning meetings were held at the DC 
headquarters, assisting the Chief of Government De la Rúa, the DC head, Victor Capilouto, 
and Heads of Secretaries such as Sanity, Health, Infrastructure (Interview with Mr Bonavota, 
GCBA Civil Defence, 12 Sep. 2000). These meetings served to update the latest information 
and actions on part of the local government. By putting together the top political executives 
with the operative staff, the information was efficiently processed and political decision 
problems could even be discussed there. Inter-organisationally, though, the information flow 
was not that efficient. The GCBA in fact called for more detailed information from Edesur in 
order to organise their work (Clarín February 18, 1999a). 
      Another instance where the informative processing between actors did not work very well 
was at a meeting with the Chamber of Deputies in the National Congress on Tuesday, 
February 23. Both Edesur and ENRE executives had been invited by the Commission of 
Consumer’s Defence to declare on the causes of the blackout and on the management of this. 
The Edesur General Manager Jaime Manzano did not appear at all, which was highly 
offensive to the deputies and provoked harsh criticism of the Edesur arrogance. The ENRE 
President Legisa applied a rather technical discourse to explain the power outage –not very 
convincing to the politicians– but devoted little time to defend the sanctioning model applied 
by ENRE which was being so harshly criticised during those days.   
     The ENRE was in permanent contact with Edesur, both formally and informally, in order 
to survey the measures of the company. 'Formality' implies making charges on the private 
company to which the company claims discharge or not. This was done, such as the ENRE 
call in first instance upon Edesur to inform on the incident, to which Edesur answered that  
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this was not a case of force majeur. By making this formal declaration the company assumed 
responsibility for the situation and the ENRE could proceed with their regulation task, that is, 
sanctioning. These formal communication channels were accompanied by informal calls, such 
as the night to Friday, February 19, when Edesur was intending to reconnect the 132 cable 
and the ENRE Vice-president Devoto was called by Edesur General Manager Manzano and 
informed electricity would be restored by midnight.  
     ”I said to him [Manzano] ‘OK, call me at home or wherever to let me know.’ At midnight 
he called me to tell me they failed, but at 3 a.m. Well, that night I didn’t sleep at all because 
he called me every two hours to tell me they had failed again and again.” (interview with 
A.Devoto, 11 September, 2000. My parenthesis) 
     The ENRE was the information provider to the national government in this case. ENRE 
had permanent contact with the Secretariat of Energy and Mining (SEM) which is its 
governmental nexus. At one point the ENRE executives were called to assist a meeting at the 
SEM with the National Cabinet and President Menem for briefing (Interview with Alberto 
Devoto, ENRE). In the national Energy Crisis Committee participated the General Secretary 
of Energy, McKarthy, as a representative of the energy sector. Thus, at a national level, the 
crisis information processing was hierarchically organised and functioned smoothly. The 
Presidency and the National Government was never really 'in the eye of the storm' of this 
crisis, although it constituted a Crisis Committee and prepared a decree for abolishing the 
Edesur shareholding. Last, but not least, the Menem government was the principal responsible 
for the privatisation processes in Argentina. While these had not found very much of an 
opposition at the moment they were accomplished, the power outage crisis catalysed heavy 
resistance against private [and in particular foreign] ownership of public services. While the 
National Government thus did embody a kind of a public scapegoat for the 'sin' of 'having 
sold out national patrimony', the public pressure was rather put on ENRE as a sanctioning 
agency; on the GCBA as a [local] governmental saviour and, not to mention, Edesur as the 
principal scapegoat. Thus, the lack of stress and pressure on the National Government 
permitted information routines to flow as normal. 
 
7.4  Communication & Mass Media  
Communication is certainly one of the most interesting aspects of contemporary crisis 
management. The way actors make public their intentions and actions in contingencies are of 
outmost importance – communication is inevitably very much part of the whole process. In 




One of the issues that Edesur received harshest criticism for was that of the lack of 
information, on the one hand, and the erroneous information, on the other. The National 
Ombudsman, Jorge  Maiorana, claimed already on the second day that Edesur should inform 
the public on the causes of the blackout (Clarín, February 18, 2001a). It was practically 
impossible to reach Edesur by phone, due to the amount of calls denouncing the lack of 
electricity, which increased anxiety and fury among the affected neighbours. The access to 
information in crisis situations is a central point, not only for decision-makers but also for the 
affected population, as exemplified in many of the studies in crisis management like for 
instance the Chernobyl crisis (Stern 1999), the Red River flooding (Svedin 1999), the 
Auckland Power Outage (Newlove, Stern & Svedin 2000), the BSE crisis (Grönvall 1999), 
the Halland tunnel (Kärde 1999).  
      On Tuesday 16 February, the electricity returned for a couple of hours. This made people 
think the problem was solved, which was not the case, however. When the lights turned black 
again, there were groceries and restaurants that had to throw away ruined merchandise and 
frustration installed in the affected areas again (Clarín, February 18, 1999b). To this incident 
was summed the Edesur declarations that electricity would be back within a couple of hours; 
this afternoon; tomorrow morning, and so on – promises which were not fulfilled. After five 
days of blackout a list with all of these unfulfilled promises, was published in the newspaper 
Clarín, counting to eight in just four days (February 19, 1999e). As in the Auckland power 
outage, where this was also a similar feature (Newlove, Stern & Svedin 2000:125-131), this 
build-up of expectations and what was actually fulfilled, created an important credibility trap. 
For Edesur the lack of credibility became an important issue in the crisis negotiation as it 
turned into an image problem. This indicates not only obstacles in the Edesur internal 
information processing, but also the relative priority that communication has within an 
organisation. Doomed but to communicate, these aspects fall somewhere outside the process 
of crisis management, which is about decision making, also on what communication strategies 
to be applied. When the Edesur Communication Management made clear they could not cope 
on their own any more, an external consultant, Nueva Comunicación, was hired. The 
consultant, in those circumstances, suggested a change in the communication strategy with 
mass media. Up until then, Edesur had entailed an open press policy, receiving journalists, 
microphones and TV-cameras and answering all their questions, but this was rather a reactive 
stance to media management where the heart of the matter was the question of when service 
would be reconnected. As the reconnection was never fulfilled and the consultant firm entered  
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the communicative scene, the strategy was changed to a proactive one, where the company 
searched up the newspapers, the TV-channels and organised press conferences in order to 
inform. Also a change in the character of the information was entailed. >From having 
answered questions on when the matter would be solved, a kind of information team was 
created in which the technical directors informed on the technical aspects of the power outage. 
It is somewhat paradoxical that while the public actors –mass media, government and political 
arena, civil society and the affected neighbours– after the first week re-framed the problem in 
economic, political and social terms, the corporate Edesur decided to emphasise further the 
technical character of the problem. Paradoxes generally have their own logic, however.  
 
As Newlove, Stern & Svedin points out in their Auckland analysis (2000:127), media 
management is not solely about giving the press access to the information that the particular 
crisis management actor is interested in making public. Media can be an actor in its own right 
(Sundelius, 1998; Stern & Nohrstedt, 1999) which has been observed in many of the case 
studies accomplished within this project, exemplified in the Lima Crisis (Ullberg, 1998), the 
Brolin-Kidnap (Nohrstedt, 1998), the Refugee crisis in Estonia (Kokk, 1999). Media works 
also as a mayor public arena where the very perception of what the crisis is about is 
determined to a great extent. This aspect is intimately linked to the notion of representation of 
a subjective problem, as discussed in the theoretical chapter. The mass media was as a whole 
very critical to the Edesur management of the power outage, which had an important social 
impact. Statistics showed that Edesur had appeared 366 times in the local radios during the 
month of February of which 226 were negative mentions, 29 were positive and 111 were 
purely informative (López Alonso, 1999:14). The national media coverage in the Edesur 
power outage was very important, due to the crisis location in the Capital Federal. The 
recurrent power outages in the suburbs of Buenos Aires, where Edesur also have coverage, or 
not to mention other parts of the country, do not nearly call the national media attention. This 
is a cynical fact of centralisation of mass media, and, in the Argentinean case, Buenos Aires is 
undeniably the centre of news production.  
     Thus, in the Buenos Aires blackout, mass media was intensely part of the entire crisis 
management process. While radio, TV and graphic press accomplished scopes, they were also 
important communication channels between Edesur and the population in both directions. The 
public manifestations held in the street were transmitted on the news and it appeared to the 
entire Argentine population that the whole of Buenos Aires was outraged and on the 
barricades, while the power outage affected only a relatively small part of Edesur clientele. Of  
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the 2.105.380 Edesur clients in the whole of Buenos Aires City, approximately 7% were 
affected during the first day (See Appendix VII and IX) (Edesur Annual Memory Balance 
1999). These televised manifestations did serve the purpose to shape a public opinion on the 
matter as it opened political windows and broke path for several civil Consumers Defence 
Organisations.     
 
Mass media as an international guild are also known to have global tentacles when it comes to 
crisis situations. Multimedia giants such as the North American CNN are known to be 'first on 
the spot' and have the resources to dedicate 24 hours live cameras to the event if necessary. 
Several scholars have pointed out the phenomena of 'disaster tourism' referring to the virtual 
invasion of journalists and curious people on the site of events, affecting in different ways the 
operative crisis response (Rosenthal & t'Hart (Eds.):1998:200, Newlove et al, 2000:126). The 
Buenos Aires Blackout was apparently no scope however. While national media, as accounted 
for above, occupied large parts of their news broadcasting and of their newspapers to this 
event, a survey of international media reports indicates this notice gained little attention 
outside Argentina. In neighbouring Brazil, as in Uruguay, only short notices were published 
and in Chile, where one would expect the conflict with the Chilean electric company Enersis 
to be of interest, the issue was scarcely developed (Chatlani, 1999). While Enersis did figure 
in Chilean news during this period, it had nothing to do with the Buenos Aires events, but to 
the negotiations with Spanish Endesa on the selling of the company (Larraín, 1999a, 1999b, 
1999c; English, 1999; Vera, 1999).  
 
7.5    Politics of Symbols & Leadership  
The symbolic dimensions of crisis management are becoming of increased interest to crisis 
management scholars, pointing at its importance Paul t’Hart (1993). Symbols are part of our 
daily life and human communication could hardly do without them. In crisis situations 
symbolic actions on part of the decision-makers and involved institutions can be of outmost 
importance as a means to demonstrate the gain of control over circumstances rather uncertain 
and sometimes perhaps completely out of control. A wide range of symbolic actions is 
observed in crisis management research. Governmental presence on scenes of disaster is 
relatively common, as in the Red River floodings in 1997 (Svedin, 1999) and the 
environmental disaster in Spain 1998 (Ullberg, 2001), where local and national politicians 
visited the affected areas by car, helicopter and plane. Other more spectacular examples are 
the Swedish killing of 21 British cows in 1997, which were potentially –although risk was  
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very small– contagious by the BSE disease (Grönvall, 1998:280); the so called Freezer project 
in the Auckland power outage, where the Mayor wanted to place a giant freezer in the 
affected area for the restaurant owners to store the food while the outage endured (Newlove, 
Stern & Svedin, 2000:138-139) and the Polish government’s removal of hundreds of 
Christian crosses placed close to the Auschwitz museum by different catholic and orthodox 
activists. In the latter case the symbolics were in fact the very core matter of this Polish crisis 
(Sawicki et al, 1999). Symbolic actions are political in the sense that they deal with 
opportunities to gain control and credibility as well as risks to loose these. Symbolic politics 
is about representation and the right to represent. Thus it is a question of power: Who 
represents what and when?  
          In the Buenos Aires blackout, the lack of water, air conditioning, elevators as a 
consequence of the power outage, provided political and administrative institutions with 
opportunities to gain prestige and credibility. The GCBA was the central institution in 
palliating the social necessities, which was done without complications by the Civil Defence, 
emergency organisation par excellence. The confiscation and destruction of food in bad shape 
from restaurants and different grocery shops was accomplished in all affected areas with the 
GCBA Sub-secretariat of Alimentary Security in charge. Chief of Government, Fernando De 
la Rúa, could as head of the Buenos Aires administration enjoy the public confidence that this 
concern for the population generated and could visit affected parts of the city confident about 
his work.   The issue of leadership is linked to the dimension of symbolics in crises. Boin & 
t'Hart pose the question whether the mission of the leader or decision-maker in a crisis is an 
almost impossible task, due to the gap between public expectation on the decision-maker and 
the 'real world' that the decision-maker lives in before, during and after a crisis (2001). 
Decisions and actions of leaders will inevitably be scrutinised and will have an important 
symbolic value. While the community expects leaders to prioritise public health, safety, and 
security, and should prepare for worst-case scenarios, research findings indicate that the high 
economic and political costs actually prevent political leaders from doing so (Ibid.). In the 
Buenos Aires case, the preparedness for an emergency such as the blackout was not really a 
prioritised issue, less in light of the severe economic, political and social problems the city 
and the entire country suffer at the moment. The fact that the city's Civil Defence had not a 
power outage considered as an emergency speaks for itself. The aspect of problem framing, as 
discussed in chapter 7.1, also shows that no worst-case scenario was constructed by any of the 
involved actors. The crisis developed in a way, however, that could be successfully 
manageable by political leaders. Communities often expect leaders to take charge of the crisis  
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management operations and exercise a clear leadership (Boin & t'Hart, 2001). This is 
particularly evident in Argentina, where patron-client relations, which requires a patron, that 
is, a strong leader, is a prevalent feature of the political system under 'normal' circumstances. 
Normally in a crisis response, however, there are multiple organisational networks involved, 
which requires co-operation, not top-down command. In the Buenos Aires Blackout the 
leadership of the crisis management was divided between the corporate and the state actors. 
Edesur assumed the role as the 'owner' of the technical problem and thus executed the 
management in line with this, while the regulating agency ENRE assumed its role as a 
supervisor, the GCBA Government as the principal relief organisation and finally the National 
Government as the ultimate guarantee in the dispute over indemnification and legal aspects in 
the electricity concession. All actors can be said to have acted in line with their functions, but 
only the GCBA Government was recognised a 'successful' leadership. Why? Well, it has 
precisely to do with symbolic dimensions. The affected clients in the city of Buenos Aires as 
well as the mass media and the political establishment required command and control of the 
situation, in order to feel safeguard. Edesur not only did not manage to solve the technical 
problem, they had severe communicational problems (see chapter 7.4) and leadership 
problems. The Edesur General Manager Jaime Manzano chooses a 'low profile', which cost 
him and the entire company credibility. In mass media declared the Edesur communication 
manager and other middle level managers, which symbolically interpreted by public opinion 
that the crisis within the company was not managed at top level, that is, it had not top priority. 
When GM Manzano did not appear in the National Congress to declare on February 24, as he 
had been 'invited' by the Chamber of Deputies, due to his "complete dedication to the crisis 
management" (Clarín, 24 February 1999a), this was perceived as a lack of will to assume 
responsibility. Also the ENRE working routines was symbolically interpreted as a lack of 
leadership. The public expectation was that the ENRE 'face the emergency' by taking 
'immediate measures', why the routine procedures of sanctioning sometimes months after the 
incident was harshly criticised as we shall se below. The absence of the ENRE president 
Legisa was publicly questioned as a matter of lack of leadership, when the ENRE Board of 
Directors is a vertical decision making structure that functions also if not all board members 
are present (Interview with ENRE Vice President Devoto). The public and political pressure 
on ENRE more or less obliged the agency to assume an active leadership in the crisis 
management, determining for example extraordinary measures such as the 292/99 resolution. 
The political leaders, on the other hand, had better luck. The GCBA Chief of Government, 
Fernando De la Rúa, featured a decisive presence in the crisis management, as if he had the  
Página 59 
 
situation under control. In reality he did nothing else but following the routines in a GCBA 
emergency response structure, embodied in the city's Civil Defence [DC]. As this organisation 
worked smoothly, co-ordinating work with other relief agencies, and everything 'worked out 
well', it was a grateful emergency situation to assume responsibility for. As a difference to the 
Mayor Les Mills in the Auckland blackout, De la Rúa did co-operate with Edesur in the crisis 
response, but he also saw to not to get publicly associated with the company as did Les Mills 
(Newlove et al, 2000:121). On the contrary, he publicly criticised the company for the lack of 
crisis management capacity, while his government through the DC saw to that the affected 
population was getting help, which perfectly responded to public expectation. The political 
opportunity this crisis provided for him, I would say, is indisputable. He was one of the 
presidential candidates for the elections later that year, why the blackout became a kind of 
symbolic support for his campaign. I would not dare to claim that this issue was decisive for 
his victory in the October elections, but surely it had some influence, as had the Auckland 
blackout for Les Mills in Auckland when he lost his mayoralty in the subsequent elections 
(Ibid.) In the Buenos Aires case it is likely that, competing with De la Rúa's political 
advantage, the sitting President Menem utilised the federal resources at hand in order to gain 
political support for his party
32 (Clarín, 19 February 1999c). The traffic assistance of the 
Federal Police; the mobilising of generators and supplies of water of the Gendarmery and the 
Peace Force of the Cascos Blancos; and the social assistance of the National Secretary of 
Social Development were of big help to the population, but they had not been called for from 
the Buenos Aires Government. This even generated political disputes in the newspapers 
between De la Rúa and the Minister of National Affairs, Carlos Corach, about which 
government had supplied most inhabitants and with what means (Clarín, 25 February, 1999b). 
This was evidently a dispute of leadership, which located the National Government on the 
scene of events, something that President Menem was in need of. Menem and his faction 
within the ruling party was at this moment trying to accomplish, against constitutional law, a 
second re-election of the sitting president, which was not easy, although on Argentinean 
terms, maybe not impossible. The blackout was therefore of symbolic value also to Menem, 
as he in a sense had to show leadership and defend the privatisation model in order to gain 
further support.  
     The coming elections were in fact the motive for the crisis to take a turn towards political 
symbolism. Ideological discussions and political stances were on the daily agenda during this 
                                                           
32 Menem represents the Justice Party or the Peronism as it is commonly called after its founder, General Perón, while De la 
Rúa represents the Radical Party in the Alliance with the Frepaso Party that actually won the elections that year, making the  
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period, as we shall see in the following chapter. The blackout and the Edesur concession 
became of great symbolic value in these discussions, as it shed light on the processes of 
privatisation entailed during the two mandates of Menem. The economic politics in Argentina 
during the 1990s have been applied in a neoliberal fashion, of which privatisation of state 
companies has been an important piece. This has not been without contestation, however. 
Although many Argentineans advocated for better services as the former SEGBA electricity 
services, for example, were really deficient with recurrent power outages, the privatisation has 
meant in most cases the acquirement of national firms by transnational and foreign investors. 
It appears that in spite of an ever more globalised world, issues like nationalism and national 
identity have not disappeared. Let us remember the altered discussions in Sweden and 
Norway on where to locate the headquarters of the joining telecommunications companies 
Telia (Sweden) and Telenor (Norway). Not only was this a corporate internal issue, but it also 
reached high political level and many Swedes and Norwegians ought to have had an opinion 
on this matter. This conflict over what appears to be a minor detail in the whole enterprise of 
the two corporations actually provoked the very failure of it. In a country like Argentina, 
where the political Right and Left historically have been united on the issue of nationness 
(Borneman, 1992),
33 the recent privatisation of the country’s state companies, has been 
discussed partly in terms of imperialism, as transnational firms have acquired national firms. 
The Buenos Aires blackout, thus, put this issue back on the political agenda in the context of 
presidential election campaigns. Naturally, the discussions about the privatisation process also 
contained ideological elements. While left wing opposition politicians criticised privatisation 
as an economic politics strategy, centre and right wing opponents did not attack the model in 
itself, but the way it was accomplished, that is, 'the Menem way'. These latter accusations 
actually ended up in harsh criticism and even a legal denouncement on the ENRE, for lack of 
control on the private concessionaires. The augment in electricity tariffs that was programmed 
for months was declared and published in the middle of the crisis, which put the SEM –
administrative instigator of 'the crime'– and the ENRE –the controlling organisation of the 
electric market– in a very bad position. How had the authorities the face to augment people's 
electricity bill when they did not even have light at that moment! This was symbolically very 
negative to the image of the government as for the company. Both the ENRE and the National 
Government were criticised by opposition for not taking responsibility for these consequences 
of privatisation (Clarín, February 18–27, 1999). An interesting turn in this 'blame game' is, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
latter sitting president.   
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though, that when the president of Enersis, the Chilean shareholder in Edesur, questioned the 
ENRE resolution 292/99 and declared Edesur would not pay any fines or indemnities that 
were not considered in the concession contract. The ideological and party political accusations 
on a national level were then transformed into a rather unison front against Chile, an historical 
'enemy' to Argentina. Sharing the Andean border, the countries have on several occasions 
been in armed conflict about territory. The last time in 1978 was over three islands in the 
southern Beagle Channel, a conflict that was aborted by the mediation of the pope. The 
Argentines and the Chileans do not, very generally speaking, have much for each other either, 
due to these historical conflicts and alleged cultural differences. That the Edesur main 
shareholder was of Chilean origin and even had the courage to oppose to Argentine legislation 
(the ENRE resolutions) therefore had a certain symbolic impact on the involved actors, not to 
mention the affected clients. In the worst of moments they felt suffering because of the 
Chileans! These, to the Argentineans, highly symbolic circumstances prompted symbolic 
actions, as the crisis lasted. The voices for annulling the concession of Edesur became more 
and louder as days passed. After the Enersis president Guzmán’s declarations, the National 
Crisis Committee elaborated a decree of necessity and emergency in order to put pressure on 
Edesur to pay the extraordinary fines determined in the ENRE resolution. The symbolic 
importance of this decree was that the national government was supporting the ENRE’s 
decision in spite of the legal doubts that were expressed by Enersis as well as local jurists. 
This action was symbolic also in the sense that it shed light on the issue of social 
responsibility in a contingency of this kind. Certainly, for local as well as national politicians 
in a state where corruption scandals are daily bread, it was a grateful opportunity to for once 
have a scapegoat from the corporate world to claim for responsibility. 
 
7.6  Sequencing & Synchronicity  
It might appear that when a catastrophe occurs, this is what is happening in the world at that 
moment. No contingency, however, takes place in a social or a political vacuum. The world 
keeps going around and other problems may turn up that require attention. This is what in 
crisis management research is called synchronicity, i. e. the occurrence of parallel or 
coincident events in the midst of a crisis that can have an impact on the crisis management 
(Stern & Nohrstedt, 1999). In the Buenos Aires blackout the fact that the power outage 
occurred in February meant that part of the involved decision-makers were on summer 
                                                                                                                                                                                     




vacations. The Edesur Communication Manager Martini was in southern Argentina and was 
informed on the phone, as was the ENRE President Legisa who was in Europe at the moment. 
Their initial absence did not affect the response to the crisis, but was undoubtedly an element 
of disturbance in the crisis management. The ENRE board of directors is composed in a 
collegial manner, which give the entire board of directors decision making authority and, in 
the Edesur case, the Communication Manager was supplied for by the Press Chief, Ignacio 
Siscardi.  
     A second example of synchronicity that tensioned further the context was the augment in 
electricity tariffs implemented from February 1, meaning an augment of three to four percent 
for the client on the next electricity bill. The Argentine electricity tariffs are regulated every 
three months and normally at that time of year the tariffs decrease. This year, however, 
counted with little precipitation and a mayor use of thermal energy, which increased costs. 
When the SEM, in the midst of the blackout, published the augment, it had a very negative 
impact on public opinion. What would under 'normal' circumstances have passed relatively 
unnoticed, was in the light of the blackout an offence. Even if the SEM set the price, it was 
Edesur that had to face the fuelled annoyance of the people.    
     For the main Edesur shareholder, Enersis in Chile, the Edesur crisis in Buenos Aires came 
at a bad point in time. The Chilean company was since the year before negotiating its holdings 
with the Spanish electricity firm Endesa and was in February 1999 defining the terms of 
negotiation in a milieu of tensions and disagreements (Larraín, 1999a; English, 1999). On the 
evening of February 24 a shareholder meeting in the headquarters of Enersis in Santiago de 
Chile would vote the constitution of the new Enersis board. This issue had been preceded by a 
lot of speculations that the Spanish company would want to take control of the Chilean firm 
(English, 1999). The meeting was held the same evening electricity was restored in Buenos 
Aires. For the Enersis president Guzmán the Edesur crisis that escalated and came to require 
his participation thus occurred in a moment of high pressure, which can be assumed to have 
influenced the decisions made. It is interesting to note that while both these negotiations (in 
Santiago de Chile between Enersis and Spanish Endesa, and in Buenos Aires between Chilean 
Enersis, Argentinean Edesur shareholders and Argentinean State) were dealing with economic 
and legal-political transactions, what was also at stake was national pride. As discussed in 
chapter 7.5 the national symbolics involved in these circumstances were of importance. When 
it comes to Spain, the Latin American countries' relation to their Madre Patria (motherland) 
is in general somewhat complicated. While Spain is for the most recognised as the 
motherland, precisely, it is also common to complain upon the legacy of colonisation. The  
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investments made during the last decade by Spanish companies in the Latin American 
countries are in many cases seen as a kind of neo-colonialism. Thus, dimensions of 
nationalism and of cultural identity constituted synchronic circumstances influencing the 
crisis management.    
     Another example of synchronicity, although more than an event this was an important 
circumstance, was the upcoming presidential elections. The governing party, the Peronist 
Party, was negotiating the candidates, which is a public and quite scandalous affair in 
Argentina. Several governors wanted to postulate for the internal elections in April that year, 
while the stance of the sitting president Menem oscillated between supporting a new 
candidate from his faction and between presenting himself for re-election in spite of going 
against his own constitutional reform.
34 Not only was this an issue that required the attention 
of the sitting president –fact apart that this was not really a national concern that would have 
required his attention– but these political circumstances did prompt stances that had some 
impact on the decision making processes. The public and political claims on the ENRE and 
the entire Menem administration for harder measures against Edesur and the need for political 
credit, prompted the Secretary of Energy and Mining (SEM) to put claims on ENRE to 
provoke the execution of guarantees in the concession contract, which would prove the 
authority of the sitting government. It is important to note here that in Argentina the political 
administration ￿at national, regional and local levels￿ practice a system that imply changing 
not only the political decision making staff, but also parts of the administrative staff as a new 
candidate assumes power. Thus, political and administrative staff identifies closely with the 
government that provided them with a post and will generally defend its decisions as long as 
it belongs to the administration. The SEM pressure on ENRE and ENRE responding with the 
resolution 291/99 is therefore rather logical in this context.  
     As mentioned earlier, the GCBA Chief of Government Fernando De la Rúa was also a 
presidential candidate, although for the opposition. His position was rather similar to that of 
Menem, however, as whatever decision and action he would make in the crisis management, 
this would be scrutinised through the lenses of the presidential elections. From a political 
opportunity perspective, De la Rúa was fortunate enough to govern a successful crisis 
management, by which he could gain political credit to his campaign.  
     For Edesur the most important synchronicity was the structural and managerial changes 
within the company. Only one month before the power outage had an important  
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reorganisation of the different departments within Edesur been entailed, which had reallocated 
staff, resources and transformed important routines. The new organisational structure was not 
really of importance to the corporate decision making process during the blackout, but it 
seems to have influenced communication and action within the company however. 
 
As stated earlier, crisis management is about decision making. According to the experience of 
crisis decision-makers, a crisis is not really perceived as such until after it is over, but is rather 
experienced by them as one problem after another to attend to (Stern, 1999:42-43). The first 
decision made generally affect the second and so on in a chain like manner. Bengt Sundelius 
use a tunnel as an analogy to crisis management in the sense that as the crisis (i.e. the tunnel) 
starts out there is a relative amount of options, but as time passes the tunnel narrows and the 
options are fewer, reaching the end of the tunnel with scarcely any option but to continue 
(1998:11). This is what is crisis management literature is called sequencing. There are some 
examples of sequencing in the Buenos Aires blackout, such as the Edesur decision to repair 
the burnt out cables in the first instance. This decision prompted the subsequent insistence on 
re-establish power supply through the same substation, which ultimately delayed the whole 
reconnection process.  
     Another example of sequencing are the decisions made by the ENRE, that started out in a 
routinely manner by calling Edesur’s attention through resolution 222/99. As the blackout 
endured and the social and political situation transformed into a crisis, the ENRE made 
decisions that could only lead to harder and harder measures with Edesur. The execution of 
guarantees and annulling the contract was not entailed because the case never really reached 
the judicial circumstances, nor was any political actor probably willing to assume the 
consequences of the ceasing of the contract although political rhetoric claimed so. The 292/99 
resolution was as close as the ENRE would reach and was way ungrounded. 
 
7.7 Credibility 
The issue of credibility is gaining attention in crisis research. Initiated scholars propose that 
there is an intimate link between the maintenance of legitimacy and crisis decision making, 
and that the interaction between these dimensions can have a decisive impact on 
communication, credibility and the decisions made (Hansén & Stern: 2001). Credibility is a 
socially constituted phenomenon and, as a crisis in itself, it can be a political resource. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
34 The constitutional reform was accomplished during the first mandate period of Menem, permitting re-election of president 
once. This was done in order to be able to be re-elected in 1995, which he was. In 1999, thus, he had already made use of this  
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Credibility gains and/or losses in the decision making process can have important symbolic 
consequences, which in turn affects the very crisis management. This phenomena can be 
found during the entire crisis process, which, for the sake of analysis, can be divided into four 
stages; pre-crisis, crisis development, crisis response and post-crisis credibility (Kuipers & 
Stern, coming) or, for the latter category, accountability and learning (Hansén & Stern, 
2001). The division between these phases is certainly not clear-cut. Defining the crisis in itself 
as a process, different phenomena like credibility issues can have its beginning in the pre-
crisis context but not have an impact on the crisis until the post-crisis phase. Hansén and Stern 
emphasise the importance of ‘faultfinding’ in the process of credibility. They mean that the 
prevailing degree of trust that exist between different actors is correlative to the faultfinding 
dynamics, that is, the positive or negative interpretation one actor will make of the other’s 
actions. The more trust, the less criticism and vice versa.  
     While the Buenos Aires blackout has not developed into a national trauma in the profound 
sense of the Swedish Prime Minister Palme assassination (1986) or the MS Estonia ferry 
accident (1994), the notion of credibility was an important feature of the whole crisis 
management. The pre-crisis credibility featured mainly two political-cultural phenomena; the 
distrust in the private corporation that only seeks profit and have no authentic interest in the 
public service it is accomplishing, and the distrust in the political establishment. For what the 
latter regards, the Argentine political life is stranded with coups d’état, populist discourses 
and corruption scandals. The last military dictatorship, with its 30,000 citizens disappeared
35 
and ending with the Malvinas (Falklands) War, has left a deep social wound as large sectors 
of the Argentine society feel they were actually fooled by the military government. It is 
important to bear in mind that the image the military presented of their de facto regime was 
one of war against communist subversion and counterinsurgency in the name of God and the 
Fatherland.  Many Argentineans, in fact, did not have the faintest idea about the abductions, 
the concentration camps, the torture and the executions that the military government actually 
accomplished.
36 On the other hand, while democracy has been installed in 1983, the state of 
things –above all the economy– has worsened, augmenting the rates of unemployment, 
poverty and social violence, while increasing the social differences. Local politicians are 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
possibility, but was ready to reform again in order to stay in power.  
35 ‘Disappearances’ in this sense refer to abduction, torture and, in most cases, death but concealing the dead bodies, thus 
making impossible the declaration of demise and burial ceremonies. This has been a rather common political strategy in 
military regimes such as the Latin American during the 1960’s and 1970’s, and also in European 20
th Century colonies, such 
as the French government in Algeria in the 1960’s. This way political adversaries –and thus political opposition– to the 
regime were removed and ‘silenced’.   
36 To read more about the atrocities of the Argentinean military rule 1976-83 see for example the report of CONADEP 
(1983).    
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generally perceived to have dedicated more effort to increase personal fortunes than to their 
mandate as democratic representatives. These features have produced a generalised distrust in 
politicians and in political life, which became manifest in the power outage. Also, as 
previously discussed, the sense of loss of a collective good, like a state owned company, to a 
foreign private company which is presumed to care but for its own profit, had left its mark of 
distrust on the Argentineans. Summoning these two facts, the pre-crisis context was one of 
distrust on the crisis managers. The national government by the mandate of president Menem 
–socially represented as an outrageously corrupt administration– was the very instigator of the 
process of privatisation and was thus supposed to defend it, no matter what,  
          Once in the crisis development stage, the blame game was began. The hypothesis of 
Hansén and Stern (2001), that if decision makers are charged with failure to prevent the crisis, 
faultfinding is to be expected
37 is applicable in the Buenos Aires case. Edesur was accused 
with having reduced production costs by dismissing 2/3 of the staff that was inherited from 
SEGBA (Clarín, February 19, 1999d) and by reducing quality controls of material and 
substations (Zlotogwiazda, M. & A. Klipphan 1999:8-13). The substation where the shortcut 
and fire was produced was actually to be the crown jewel of the Edesur investments,
38 but 
once occurred the power outage, the company was charged with negligence in the 
transmission tests entailed, which finally caused the fire and the power outage. The substation 
was not adequately equipped, lacking the sand that normally covers the cables as an igniting 
prevention measure and lacking fire extinguishers; no emergency plan was employed; and the 
number of technicians present during the tests was insufficient (Ibid.). Also the ENRE was 
quickly distrusted in its functions. Accusations for not having controlled the installations in 
the Edesur substation before authorising transmission tests were raised against the control 
organisation (Clarín, February 19, 1999d). These early claims on Edesur and the ENRE did 
define the crisis as having been possible to avoid and responsibility fell hardest on these two 
actors, which would follow them through the whole crisis. In the crisis response phase the 
ENRE continued to be blamed for lack of control and lack of sanctioning power over the 
concession company Edesur. The judicial charge and the subsequent police raid at their 
respective headquarters were instances where the lack of credibility and the scrutinising of the 
crisis copers became explicit. Also when the ENRE executives were invited to the National 
Congress, by the second week of the crisis, they were harshly criticised by the deputies and 
                                                           
37 ‘Proposition 1: Crisis Development. To the extent that decision-makers are blamed for failure to prevent or mitigate the 
crisis, faultfinding dynamics in subsequent phases are more likely to be provoked.’ (Hansén and Stern, 2001)  
38 The construction of the substation Azopardo Nueva cost US$ 45 millions and was programmed to be inaugurated     
in February 1999 (Hechos, March/April 1999, p.7)  
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had great difficulties in explaining their competence as well as their legal tools and 
procedures for dealing with the crisis. Thus, in this case is applicable the hypothesis that when 
a decision-maker is charged with inadequate crisis response, faultfinding increases and 
legitimacy decreases.
39 The evaluation of the Edesur crisis management, on their part, became 
harder and harder. In spite of that the number of affected clients was reduced day by day and 
the company got closer to a technical solution, their credibility had already been consumed by 
the repeated promises of restored service that were never fulfilled. This loss of credibility 
illustrates the fifth hypothesis that ‘Crisis communication which heightens media and public 
expectations is likely to promote faultfinding and impose legitimacy costs if subsequent 
performance does not measure up.’ (Hansén & Stern, 2001).  
     The phase of post-crisis or accountability and learning has also featured dimensions of 
credibility losses in the Buenos Aires blackout. While the parliamentary hearings were 
entailed already on Tuesday, February 23, and an expert panel had been called for on 
Wednesday, February 24 by the ENRE (ENRE Resolution 297/99), in order to allocate 
responsibilities, accountability continued also once electricity was restored. ENRE resolved, 
the same day electricity was restored, on Wednesday, February 24, to entail a Public 
Audience
40 where all involved actors would have the opportunity to speak and make their 
claims (ENRE Resolution 298/99). This was held one month later at the ENRE headquarters. 
The different political and consumers defence organisations’ representatives again raised 
harsh criticism against Edesur, ENRE and the Secretariat of Energy (ENRE - Public 
Audience, March 30-31, 1999). Besides the charges raised in a federal court against the 
ENRE and Edesur by an independent lawyer during the first week of the crisis, which was 
also a loss of credibility to these institutions, a number of judicial charges were also made 
after the acute phase of the power outage. The Buenos Aires ombudsman handed in a 
collective charge against Edesur on behalf of all affected Porteños (Clarín, February 26, 1999) 
and Edesur made charges its providers of material, Pirelli Cables and Alstom, to the local 
justice (Edesur Annual Memory 1999). The Decree that was prepared by the National 
Government to reinforce the ENRE resolution 292/99 in case Edesur insisted on not paying 
the extraordinary fines, was in a way also an issue of distrust. Edesur had already claimed the 
ENRE resolution lacked legal sustains and important argentine lawyers had also expressed 
their doubts on its judicial fundaments. This lack of credibility on the controlling organisation 
                                                           
39 Proposition 2: Crisis response. To the extent that decision-makers are blamed for an inadequate operative crisis response, 
legitimacy decreases and the disposition towards faultfinding (with regard to subsequent evaluations) increases. (Hansén & 
Stern, 2001) 
40 The Public Audience was set to March 8. This was postponed, however, through Resolution 299/99 to March 30.   
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could actually turn the whole thing over and make the argentine state economically and 
politically responsible for the damages caused. The decree was therefore important in order to 
restore credibility for the state actors, although it never became necessary to actually apply it. 
     Hansén & Stern (2001) present a seventh hypothesis to be tested in future research on 
those crises that have developed into national traumas. They propose that when responsibility 
of a crisis and/or the management of it have not been allocated by the end of post-crisis phase, 
credibility losses and faultfinding are prone to become chronic. The Buenos Aires blackout 
was not developed into a trauma, even less a national one, but there are notions in this 
hypothesis that are plausible in this Argentine case. While it can be said that consensus has 
been achieved regarding the responsibilities in the power outage, these actors, mainly Edesur, 
suffered a severe credibility loss that endures until this day. As soon as there is a problem that 
has anything to do with electricity in Buenos Aires, the mass media is prone to publish huge 
headlines on the incidents. Both in the summer months of year 2000 and 2001, there were 
repeated outages of power in the midst of heat waves, which has brought media to ask if the 
nightmare of the 1999 blackout will be repeated. Also in 2000, due to a public denouncement 
by a family whose daughter died in leukaemia, Edesur and all other electricity companies 
were accused of using lethal materials in the transformers, being an environmental and public 
health problem. The media race was again haunting Edesur and EDENOR, which were 
obliged to recognise publicly the use of the harmful PCB in their transformers, producing 
severe negative effects on the surrounding environment and posing a severe health risk to the 
neighbours (Clarín, 20 October, 2000).
41 The negative image of the company since the 
blackout has proved difficult to revert, indicating that the issue of credibility is of outmost 
importance in crisis management as in everyday work.  
 
7.8 Expertise 
Crisis research has shed light on the role of experts in crisis situations, a guild more or less 
central in decision making processes (Rosenthal & t’Hart, 1991; Newlove, Stern & Svedin, 
2000). Among the different subjective apprehensions of the situation at hand, the expert is 
generally ascribed objectivity and capability of giving the right assessment and thereby 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
  
41 PCB [Polychlorinated Biphenyl] is an organic substance that has been widely used all over the world for construction of 
buildings and in electric components. The PCBs are viscous substances and is in electric transformers used as refrigerating 
material. PCBs affect the environment negatively, for instance by producing reproduction problems in fauna. PCBs are also 
proved to negatively affect human health, such as the nervous system and cognitive capacities, the immunological system and 
can plausibly lead to cancer (Swedish Environmental Agency, 12 February 2001; Committee on Remediation of PCB-




legitimising the decisions made (Sundelius et al, 1997:198). While a distinction can be made 
between inside and external expertise (Kärde, 1999), and between technical and socio-
political experts (Newlove, Stern & Svedin, 2000:141) none of these are homogeneous 
groups, however. In the environmental crisis in Spain, 1998, the different scientific stances 
regarding values of contamination in soil and water even became headlines in the press, which 
invited to public as well as political distrust (Ullberg, 2001). In the Buenos Aires blackout 
there were many groups of expertise involved. While all involved actors counted on internal 
expertise, external specialists were also hired. Edesur, in its character of provider of 
electricity, naturally counts on engineers and technicians to attend technical matters. These 
were also the principal actors to assess on what solution to apply in order to reconnect the 
failed cables. When their solutions failed, however, ENRE as a surveying organisation, 
enabled its technicians to control and assess their Edesur colleagues. Thus, experts were 
assessing experts. The ENRE did not satisfy with this, however, but also hired a research team 
from the High Tension Laboratory of the La Plata National University (ENRE Annual Report 
1999). They produced an exhaustive report on their analysis of the case and substantial 
information for the ENRE as well as for the SEM (ENRE Expert Report, May 1999).  
     While Edesur counted on sophisticated expertise in matters of electricity, the company did 
feel a lack on specialised staff in other management areas. When the Communication 
Department felt the situation was going out of hand, the decision to hire an external consultant 
firm in communication was made. The consultant Nueva Comunicación was considered to be 
the Argentinean top one firm in matters of communication (Dillenberger, & Curubeto, 
1999:14). The consultant was an important support to Martini and his Communication 
Management in this pressed situation, suggesting new communicational strategies by which 
change the informative course.  
     Another external actor was involved in the crisis through Edesur. As the reconnections 
failed one time after another, Edesur finally concluded that there was a problem with the 
material. The provider of the cables that failed was the company Pirelli Cables and Edesur 
made this responsible for the failures. This prompted Pirelli to send their own experts from 
Italy to join the Argentine Pirelli staff in order to investigate the cables used and the causes of 
the accident (Clarín, February 20, 1999c). Their opinion –in spite of the risk for partiality– 
were of importance for the credibility of Edesur and resulted in Edesur bringing suit against 
Pirelli in order to determine responsibilities (Edesur Annual memory 1999:57), thus, forming 
part of the entire blame game. 




As discussed in the theoretical chapter in this report, the issue of institutional dynamics is an 
important aspect of crisis management. To what extent is an institution a homogeneous actor 
and how does it shape individual thought and action? Organisational response to a crisis has a 
lot to do with learning (Lebow, 1981; March & Olsen, 1989; Sundelius et al, 1997; Stern, 
1999). Learning is a cognitive process that relates to the human capacity of representing and 
making a meaning out of the world. Learning also has to do with memory and oblivion. For 
the purpose of crisis research it is interesting to see how institutions remember or forget 
previous experiences as part of a learning process (Sundelius et al, 1997:41-42). Now, as 
Newlove, Stern & Svedin pose the question (2000:151); Can an institution learn per se or is 
this a purely individual feature? In line with Newlove, Stern & Svedin (Ibid.) I hold there is 
systemic learning, which is entailed through the social organisation of the individuals that 
constitute the institution. As Mary Douglas remarks: ”The whole approach to individual 
cognition can only benefit from recognizing the individual person’s involvement with 
institution-building from the very start of the cognitive enterprise” (1985:67). Thus, learning 
is loaded into institutional memory or oblivion through social organisation, that is, decision-
making structures, routines and norms, by which the individuals within this institution think, 
decide and act.  
          Newlove, Stern & Svedin divide learning processes into three categories; pre-crisis 
learning,  intra-crisis  learning and post-crisis learning, referring to prior personal and 
historical experiences (pre-crisis); the lessons learned during the particular crisis (intra-crisis) 
and the inquires entailed afterwards a crisis (post-crisis) (2000:151). In difference with the 
Auckland power outage, in the Buenos Aires blackout there were recent historical analogies 
to draw upon in the crisis management – the very same New Zealand experience the year 
before. This case was not very known of by any of Buenos Aires actors, however. In Edesur, 
as well as in the ENRE and the SEM, the search for similar power outage crises began once 
the blackout in Buenos Aires was already a fact. Information on the mentioned Auckland 
case, the New York blackout in 1977 and the Canada ice storm in 1997 was gathered 
(Interviews with D. Martini, Edesur and A. Devoto, ENRE). The GCBA Civil Defence did 
not either have any knowledge of previous blackouts in that size. In fact, the DC did not even 
count power outages to their list of potential contingencies (Interview with Ruben O. Sanchez, 
Civil Defence). Fact is there is a local historical analogy. In August 1962 a ten days long 
power outage at SEGBA affected 25% of the Buenos Aires population as well as vast 
industrial areas, causing severe problems. This blackout and the management of it were not  
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recalled by any of the involved actors. It had occurred almost 40 years earlier, when many of 
the decision-makers were perhaps not even born, but this oblivion also sustains the idea that 
institutions forget. Thus, the blackout in Buenos Aires turned out to be an intra-crisis instance 
of learning for all involved actors. The DC –in spite of being the catastrophe organisation– 
had to co-ordinate all participating forces, from their own staff to the military and to the 
Federal Peace Force Cascos Blancos, distributing mobile generators, drinking water, ice, food 
in some cases, candle lights. The GCBA also organised the entire operation in attending 
lonely elders trapped in their departments and confiscating food in bad state. The ENRE, by 
sanctioning Edesur, had to create new jurisprudence for this kind of situations of contractual 
irregularity. While the clauses of execution of guarantees provided in the contract do 
contemplate the re-negotiation of concession, nobody that participated in the privatisation 
process had really imagined this could be put on trial. This experience shed light on the need 
for a clear legislation and terms of contract when it comes to the issue of responsibilities in a 
contingency.  Finally, Edesur, who appeared as the mayor scapegoat in this crisis, learned 
several lessons on the way. The first was a matter of preparedness. A situation like this had 
been unthinkable to the company, why no action plan 'in case' existed. Many of the ideas on 
‘what to do next’ were based on previous knowledge, like the technical solutions. The 
estimations of time to reconnect electricity, for example, were based on routine timetables for 
this kind of tasks (Dillenberger & Curubeto, 1999:13). As these did not work out, however, 
new solutions had to be created in the very moment the problems occurred. This later 
prompted the creation of a General Contingency Plan that will permit Edesur to better 
preparedness for crises in the future (Edesur Annual Memory 1999:17). The second lesson 
learned was the issue of communication and information. Important aspects such as what, 
when and where to process information and communicate with authorities, mass media and 
clients, were capitalised during the same crisis. This experience prompted, with the help of an 
external consultant, new communicational strategies in order to restore some of the public 
confidence.  
     In matters of post-crisis learning, the Buenos Aires blackout do not come close to the level 
of inquiries and scrutinising in the Auckland power outage (Newlove, Stern & Svedin 
2000:154-160). No vast governmental report has been published, nor has Edesur published 
any particular document on the case, as a means of informing but also in order to capitalise 
the experience into learning. The Edesur staff magazine ‘Hechos’
42 did devote an entire 
number to the 'Azopardo event', but in rather general terms. The ENRE also informs on the  
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blackout in their Annual Report 1999, but is a general description. An event that served the 
purpose of post-crisis learning was the Public Audience held at the ENRE headquarters in the 
end of March 1999, approximately one month after the blackout. Here were all involved 
actors represented, including affected clients, and although the debate was very much held in 
terms of responsibility and indemnities, it functioned also as a forum for voicing important 
other aspects of the crisis (ENRE Public Audience, 30-31 March, 1999). 
 
 
8.  Conclusions & Considerations 
This case study has aimed at analysing the management of the blackout that stroke parts of the 
city of Buenos Aires in February 1999, in order to know more about this particular case, but 
also to develop knowledge upon management of infrastructural contingencies such as a power 
outage. This is particularly interesting considering the high electricity dependency in modern 
societies and especially in urban settings. There are several conclusions to be drawn and many 
considerations to be made for the purpose of crisis management practice.  
 
Infrastructural contingencies share with many other categories of crises the feature of putting 
not only a group of decision-makers at strain, but also large parts of populations in a direct 
manner. The interruption of electricity in an urban setting has an important social impact, be it 
for a couple of hours, for days as in the Buenos Aires case or for months as in Auckland. The 
level of social impact, and the cultural and political context in which this strikes, will in turn 
have an impact on the entire scene for crisis management. In Buenos Aires the 11 days of 
electricity outage left residents, shopkeepers, offices and industries without light, water, 
sewage, refrigeration, air conditioning, elevators, traffic lights, computerised systems, and 
other electricity dependant services in the midst of summer temperatures over +30
oC. This 
required specific palliative measures and resources such as for example distribution of 
drinking water and mobile generators, and the personal attention of old people 'trapped' in 
their apartments. But it also required political response as the people affected invaded the 
streets, loudly protesting and burning car tires, claiming not only for the electricity supply to 
be restored but also for 'justice' as paying customers of a private company that offers a public 
service. This put hard pressure on both the Corporation as responsible for its affected clients, 
and on the State as the ultimate responsible for its affected citizens.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
42 'Facts'  
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     Categorising crises as 'credibility crises', 'infrastructural crises', 'natural disasters', 'man-
made catastrophes' and others, addresses the question of whether there are any substantial 
differences in their management when it comes to decision making processes. In line with the 
definition of 'a crisis' as a situation characterised by urgency, uncertainty and in which 
important values are threatened, there is no conceptual difference between any of the different 
crisis categories, as they all by definition share these criteria. The decision-maker in regard 
will have to make the decisions within this crisis context, be it due to a power outage, a 
currency crisis, a nuclear fallout, an unsolved murder case or a flood. What differs is rather 
the social impact, that is, its' kind of impact and its magnitude, which has to do with the threat 
to basic values. Following the social constructivist stance sketched in the theoretical chapter 
of this report, I hold that the values at stake, the social impact of a crisis and including the 
cultural perception of risk (an issue not explored in this analysis, but nevertheless an 
important aspect of crisis research) are socially and culturally constructed. With cultural 
variation in mind it could be pertinent to categorise the different values and the threats to 
them. While a currency crisis inevitably affects an entire nation (and most probably the global 
financial community in some way) and a credibility crisis such as the unsolved assassinate of 
the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme can produce national traumas, they pose no direct 
threat to such basic values as life, subsistence or death, just to name a few rather essential 
values to society and to societies, cultural differences apart. When the threat is direct, 
however, embodied in the lack of food or water, in disease, in the lack of sheltering or in 
death, the social impact is concrete and tangible, not to say inescapable, to affected 
individuals and to society at large. From a decision-makers perspective the magnitude of the 
social impact in this sense, and the reciprocal social and political pressure it produces, 
inevitably exacerbates the constraints on space and time for decision-making. The affected 
community and society at large want the pertinent decisions to have been taken 'the day 
before' and immediate response is required in light of people's concrete suffering. While there 
were no fatal victims in the Buenos Aires power outage, the social situation for the hundreds 
of thousands directly affected inhabitants was unbearable, which certainly put a particularly 
harsh pressure on the decision-making actors involved.  
     The issue of the social and political nature of any crisis cannot be dismissed and less when 
its complexity evolves in spheres of 'public' and 'private'; 'citizenship' and 'clientele'. While 
the idea and practice of citizenship is traced to the ancient Greek and its democracy, or to the 
French Revolution, the notion of 'the consumer' as a feature of the Modern State is more 
recent. The notion of 'the citizen' as an individual social role with rights and obligations  
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versus the State is nowadays including also the Market. Surely, this is a sign of our times, in 
which the practice of consumption is central of our post-industrial way of life and to the 
contemporaneous State, framed as they are by a global liberal market economy. On the other 
hand, the 'consumership' in this case refers to the consumption of Public Services and this is 
where the State remains on stage as former public service provider and as controller of the 
privatised services. 'The consumer' as a social role is in this regard tangling with the role of 
'citizen'.  
     When it comes to crisis management in such a complex context, then, the issue of 'Who 
owns the problem?' becomes central and highly symbolic. In the Buenos Aires case the issue 
of responsibility allocation increased tension between the corporation and electricity provider 
(Edesur) on the one hand, and the Argentinean State embodied in the supervising agency of 
electric services (ENRE) and the National Government on the other. This escalated the very 
crisis as the solution of the problem (i.e. the power outage) was delayed, aggravating the 
social impact for every day in darkness. 
     The meanings of cultural and political symbols of our daily life are likely to be emphasised 
in a contingency, either exacerbating them or strengthening their positive force. What appears 
as a technical operative problem at first sight can easily transform into a social and political 
crisis with longstanding consequences. The values at stake will play an important role in this 
development. In the Buenos Aires case the corporate actor Edesur was defending a range of 
values, not only the reputation of the firm, but also the exchange value of the company's 
shares, an important sum of money in fines and the very concession of Edesur. Individual 
corporate actors were also defending their posts, fully aware of that nobody is irreplaceable. 
Also for the governmental actors, ENRE as well as local and national governments, important 
gains and losses were at stake. The electricity regulating agency ENRE's legitimacy as a 
newly constituted State bureau, whose raison d'être is control of service, was at risk. 
Simultaneously, at an individual level, the upcoming presidential campaign in the end of 1999 
operated as a kind of synchronic circumstance and a window of opportunities for the Buenos 
Aires Mayor Fernando De la Rúa, candidate for presidency, as well as for the President 
Menem, whose intentions at that moment was to be re-elected. For the government, the issue 
of economic responsibility cannot have been of minor importance. Significant amounts of 
money in terms of fines to the affected clients were at stake and since the Argentinean state 
finances were at that point in a severe negative unbalance, the risk of having to pay these fines 
was threatening. Now, were these threatened values the reason for this event to develop into a 
long-term crisis? In my view, the economic aspect of the crisis was undoubtedly of  
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importance, but what was really a basic value in threat here, and what set the longstanding 
terms of the crisis, was the very model of Public Service in it self and the credibility of such a 
model. The process of privatisation of the Public Services in Argentina has served as an 
example of state structural adjustments for other countries, either as an inspiration or as a 
negative experience. The blackout and the crisis that was produced in its wake, thus, operated 
as a catalyst in a larger social and political process in Argentina in which the restructuration 
of the State, the processes of democratisation and the forces of the global market are central 
elements.   
     In face of this value complexity that in many ways determined the crisis management of 
the corporate and the public actors, is it possible to distinguish differences and/or similarities 
in their respective crisis management strategies? Both corporate and public actors in the 
Buenos Aires Blackout responded essentially in line with their respective tasks. That is, 
Edesur concentrated on restoring electricity, ENRE focused on the control and sanction of 
Edesur, the local government of the City of Buenos Aires and its Civil Defence helped the 
affected population out, and the National Government backed the measures of the ENRE and 
the Buenos Aires Government. For both corporate and public actors the initial problem 
framing was one of a short term, which delayed actions other than the repair of the burnt out 
cables. For all actors the level of decision escalated as the crisis developed. The Edesur Board 
of Directors came to take orders from the main shareholder Enersis in Chile and the ENRE 
was pressured from the Secretariat of Energy and from the National Government. All actors 
applied reactive media and communicative strategies, at least in the beginning. While the 
ENRE was harshly criticised in mass media, the 'head hunted' was really Edesur. A certain 
transparency featured the information provided by the company, but this was not sufficient to 
repair the loss of public credibility, as the information flow was confusing. The pressure on 
Edesur Communication Department was so hard and the communicative strategy had such a 
negative impact, that an external consultant firm was hired in to 'save' the situation, which 
was done by applying a proactive communicative stance. Also the public actors hired external 
expertise. In order to gather accurate information the High Tension Laboratory at the La Plata 
University elaborated a report of the events to the ENRE. When it comes to learning, both 
corporate and public actors in this case had to learn in an ad hoc manner in many senses, since 
it was the first time such a long power outage stroke them. Thus, in essence, it appears to exist 
more similarities than differences between the corporate and public crisis management, at 
least in this case.        
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Is this a surprising conclusion or could anything else have been expected? The spaces in 
which Corporate and State actors engage today are blurred and mixed with each other in the 
midst of legal frameworks, political conjunctures and cultural norms. It is therefore difficult to 
find generic and clear cut answers to questions such as if private ownership of a public service 
has any particular incidence in the management of an infrastructural crisis. In this case there 
were in essence no differences between the public and corporate actors in organisational 
terms. This has both empirical and theoretical explanations. Theoretically there are reasons to 
avoid separating the concepts of 'corporate' and 'public'. A basic premise of the cognitive 
institutional framework used here is that the social actors analysed are collective and 
institutional, be they small governmental decision making groups or large corporations. I have 
also emphasised my stance regarding individual action as institutionally contained and 
constrained. Now, categorising the Corporation and the Governmental Agency as 
diametrically opposed social actors and expecting opposed behaviour through the ideology 
that (supposedly) involve them will dismiss the theoretical approach. Instead Corporations 
and Governmental Agencies must be defined as essentially social institutions that embody the 
State and the Market, which are social, cultural, political and economic fields in which these 
institutions act and negotiate. Empirically it stands clear that these fields are (again, 
particularly in today's state of the State) not opposed nor juxtaposed, but rather interfacial, 
sharing unfixed boundaries and thus blending, 'invading' each others 'territories'. For the 
Corporation maximising profit would be its essential purpose, but it still remains an 
organisation that acts and profits, not only within a legal and political framework, but also by 
and within a network of social and cultural norms. On the other hand, the Governmental 
Agency that is supposed to be an impersonal, apolitical and 'neutral' institution is also 
contained and constrained by personal ambition, secret alliances, political loyalties and, of 
course, money. Thus, in the Buenos Aires case the social and political pressure on Edesur to 
assume responsibility for the losses of the affected clients, although this was beyond the 
clauses of the concession contract, responded to the cultural assumption that any company 
that provides (even in the market sense of the word, that is, sells) a public service, 
simultaneously holds a social responsibility. The Argentinean State, in turn, that had 
delegated public service to the Market through privatisation, was expected to act vigorously in 
a Keynesian manner, defending the interests of its citizens and the economy of the Nation and 




Finally, some short and concise key considerations for practical purposes that evolves from 
the analysis of the Buenos Aires case.  
When it comes to framing the problem: be careful with the setting of time frames. What 
appears to be a quickly solved problem can easily turn into a long-term crisis, as this case 
has put in evidence. Also be aware of the 'worst case scenario' approach versus the 'rosy-
scenario' stance. A balance between the two must be sought, in order to gain public 
attention and credibility, but to avoid social unrest and legitimacy losses.  
Regarding symbolic values, again, social, cultural and political dimensions of a crisis 
cannot be dismissed. A crisis generates political and social responsibilities that are 
expected to be assumed by the decision maker/s. In the Buenos Aires power outage all 
involved actors were harshly reminded of this when street riots by affected Porteños 
began. Be aware that an overstatement of concern can be counterproductive, however, as 
in the Auckland power outage where the Mayor's concern was instead interpreted as 
covering up for the [failing] power company. 
The issue of credibility is intimately related to symbolics. This is a vital capital to the 
decision-maker and must not be wasted. There are gains to be made relatively easy. The 
losses that are risked, however, are very difficult to repair afterwards, which will have an 
important impact on the whole of the crisis management. In the Buenos Aires case the 
contradicting flow of information from Edesur produced an important loss of credibility 
for the company which only escalated the crisis. 'Thinking one step further' is thus 
recommended, although circumstances will probably difficult this intention.  
Communication is a vital process in crisis management. This evolves with the affected 
community and with the public in general; with other public and private institutions and 
organisations; with mass media; and within the same institution where the decision-maker 
acts. The necessity of 'knowing what is going on' is essential for all involved persons in a 
crisis in order to make decisions and to act upon them. As above exemplified, the lack of 
efficient and clear communication in the Buenos Aires crisis proved to be a vital and 
decisive issue for the entire crisis development. Thus, the decision-maker must be prone to 
constantly inform, and any communicative obstacles that might appear in a crisis situation 
should be avoided by the provision of several alternative channels.  
 
The Buenos Aires blackout had no fatal victims, nor any severe material damages, and can on 
the whole be considered 'a successfully managed crisis'. The scrutinising of the case, however, 
puts in evidence several points of weakness of the crisis management capacity of these  
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particular actors in Buenos Aires and in Argentina in general. While scrutinising a case like 
this can help us to learn from past experiences, a systematic comparison with other cases of 
power outage would take us further in this learning process. This has been beyond the scope 
of this study, but will be undertaken in a near future. In light of society's increased electricity 
dependency world wide during the last decades, the study of crises in power production and 
supply is imminent and well justified. With a reciprocal purpose of making crisis research 
findings available to crisis management practitioners and vice versa, we need to know more 
about how social, political and economic actors intersect and interact in a 'high tech' context 
when this breaks down. The issue of 'private' and 'public' spheres for and in crisis 
management situations deserves to be challenged and compared with other studies on such 
contexts. Hopefully the findings from this case study will provoke questions and contests. 
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Newspapers Printed Editions 
 
El Diario de la República (San Luís, Argentina) 
 
24 November 2001   Datos preliminares del Censo Nacional 2001 [Preliminary results of the  
National Census 2001] 
 
 
Newspapers Internet Editions 
 
Clarín    www.clarin.com.ar 
 
1999 
16 February a)     Un incendio dejó a diez barrios sin electricidad [A fire left ten 
city  
areas without electricity] 
                    b)       Historias de un día complicado [Histories from a complicated 
day] 
17 February a)     Indemnizarán a usuarios afectados por el corte [Clients affected 
by the 
blackout will be indemnified] 
                    b)     El apagón tampoco perdonó a los abuelos [The blackout had no  
compassion with the elders] 
                    c)     Sin luz, sin agua y con bronca [Without light, without water and 
with  
anger] 
18 February a)               Edesur promete que desde hoy a ningún usuario le faltará la luz  
[Edesur promises that from today no client will lack electricity] 
       b)     Comienzan las demandas de los damnificados contra Edesur. [The   
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      charges of the harmed Edesur clients begin]  
19 February a)                Calles cortadas y velas encendidas. [Blocked streets and lit 
candles] 
b)  Quieren que las sanciones para Edesur sean más duras. [The DCOs 
want harder sanctions against Edesur]  
c)  Menem no quiere regalarle la protesta a la oposición [Menem doesn't 
want to give away the protest to the opposition] 
d)  La luz no volvió y los cortes se extendieron a otros barrios [The light 
did not come back  and the blackout extended to other blocks] 
e)  Las promesas de la empresa, día a día [The company's promises, day 
by day] 
20 February a)     Pese a todas las promesas, ahora Edesur ya no sabe cuando 
volverá  
la luz. [In spite of all promises, Edesur has no idea when lights will be 
back] 
b)  Los vecinos demonstraron su furia con fogatas y cortes. [The 
neighbours manifested their fury with street fires and blockades]. 
c)  Todavía nadie sabe qué está pasando [Nobody knows what is going 
on] 
d)  El Gobierno formó un comité de crisis [The government constituted a 
crisis committee] 
21 February      Todavía quedan más de 30 mil usuarios sin luz. [There are still 30,000  
clients without lights] 
22 February   Edesur debería pagarle 60 millones a la gente. [Edesur should pay 60 
millions to the people]  
23 February a)   Masivo retiro de formularios para reclamar por el corte. [Massive 
fetching of fill in forms to claim for the blackout] 
        b)    Reunión en Diputados. [Meeting in the Deputies']   
24 February     Admiten que tampoco hoy habrá luz para todos. [It is admitted that  
there will not be light for everybody today either] 
        a)     La Alianza le pegó muy fuerte al Gobierno por el corte de luz 
[The  
Alliance accused the Government for the power outage 
                     b)    Edesur faltó a la cita y no dio explicaciones a los diputados 
[Edesur did  
                  not show up and gave no explications to the Deputies] 
25 February a)   Edesur no quiere pagar la multa de 100 millones. [Edesur doesn’t  
want to pay the 100 million-fines] 
          b)     La pelea política por el apagon [The political fight of the 
blackout]  
26 February    Ahora recurren a un decreto para que Edesur pague. [Now they turn  
    to a decree in order to oblige Edesur to pay]  
27 February     El Gobierno insiste en que Edesur deberá pagar la multa. [The  
Government insists that Edesur must pay the fine.] 
 
2000 
20 October    Aún quedan tranformadores con una sustancia altamente tóxica.  





El País     www.elpais.es 
 
18 May 2001    Arias, J.  
El Gobierno Brasileño anticipa el racionamiento de energía  
previsto para junio [The Brazilian Government anticipates energy  
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Source: Edesur 1999 
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II: Reconnection in the Tunnel
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